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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Option can be specifically enforced when it is 
supported by "other good and valuable considerationM not specifically 
itemized on the face of the Option and when it was exercised after an 
attempted withdrawal of the Option by the optionor. 
2. Whether parol evidence was admissible to show that the 
Option and other related contracts were not individually integrated, 
that the parties did not intend part of the consideration recited in 
the Option to be paid and that the subject matter of the other 
separate, but contemporaneous, contracts was intended to provide 
overlapping consideration for the Option, all as parts of one 
multi-faceted and interdependent transaction. 
3. Whether the trial court did find, as Appellants allege, that 
the totality of the interdependent transactions entered into by 
Appellants and Colman were simply a loan secured by a mortgage and, 
if so, the legal effect of such a finding. 
4. Whether the subject Option was an ,fextension11 of a prior, 
valid and binding option; and, if so, whether any such extension was 
supported by adequate consideration. 
5. Whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence for 
a limited purpose a partyfs handwritten notes, alleged to be 
fragmentary and incomplete. 
6. Whether Respondent is legally entitled to the interest 
accruing on the tender sum deposited with the Clerk of the Court 
after Appellants wrongfully repudiated said tender and retained 
possession of the ranch? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of an option to buy 
land and for payment of accruing interest on the rejected tender sum. 
Appellants have appealed from the Judgment and Decree entered on Aug-
ust 7, 1986 by the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable Omer 
J. Call presiding, ordering specific performance for Plaint iff/Re-
spondent Ernest J. Miller and also awarding him the accrued interest. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Third Party Defendant Bill Colman is a shareholder and President 
of Royalty Investment Corporation ("Royalty11), a Utah corporation. 
Colman acquired the "Anderson Ranch11
 %(an 1,840 acre ranch in Cache 
County, Utah) for Royalty by purchasing the same in 1961 under a 
Contract of Sale with LaMar Anderson and Lucille Anderson as Sellers. 
(F. 1, 3; Tr. 53, 651) 
In the late Summer or early Fall of 1981, Colman approached Ap-
pellant John Archer for a loan of $750,000.00, which Colman urgently 
needed to continue development of his Carson Sink salt project (cer-
tain mineral rights and evaporation ponds in Nevada used for commer-
cial salt production). Said mineral project (owned by Owanah Oil 
Corporation, of which Colman was President) was in serious financial 
trouble. Subsequently, Archer advised Colman that Archer and Appel-
lant Elliott Wolfe, with whom Archer had discussed Colman1s offer, 
were not interested in a simple loan, nor were they interested in ad-
vancing the amount requested. Colman suggested that any funds ad-
vanced could be secured by the Anderson Ranch. (Tr. 533-539) The 
possibility of a limited partnership interest in the Carson Sink salt 
project was also discussed. Based upon these prelirainary discus-
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sions, Colman had his long time attorney, Frank J. Allen (Tr. 
545), prepare a document (Ex. 1) by which Archer and Wolfe would 
invest $600,000.00 in a limited partnership for the Carson Sink 
project, which investment Colman would secure with a Trust Deed on 
the Anderson Ranch. Said document was never executed. (F. 4, 5, 6; 
Tr. 41, 42, 48, 533-536, 550, 731, 972) 
After considering certain tax savings possibilities with their 
accountants, Archer and Wolfe subsequently advised Colman that they 
were only interested in advancing Colman $500,000.00 total for his 
salt project, and only on condition that the $500,000.00 be structur-
ed to appear by written record as (1) an investment of $250,000.00 in 
a limited partnership on the salt project, providing tax write-offs 
for research and development expenses, and with an interest in pro-
fits during the life of the partnership and an overriding royalty 
thereafter, and (2) a payment of $250,000.00 as the purchase price 
for the Anderson Ranch, coupled with a one-year option in Colman to 
reacquire the Ranch for $600,000.00, which would permit Appellants to 
treat the difference as a capital gain. (F. 2, 7, 8; Tr. 152, 
430-431, 739-740, 788, 796, 822, 829, 842, 846) Colman agreed in 
principle. In October and/or November of 1981, Archer, Wolfe and 
Colman met with Allen at the latterfs office on at least two separate 
occasions, first to discuss their agreement and later to execute the 
documents prepared by Mr. Allen pursuant to their instructions. 
Allen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and Colman that, although the 
primary purpose of the arrangement was to get $500,000.00 to Colman 
for his salt project, they wanted the deal structured such that it 
would appear as three separate transactions (i.e., the limited 
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partnership, the purchase of the ranch, and the option back to 
Colman on the ranch) in order to secure Archer and Wolfe all the tax 
advantages they were seeking. The structure of the deal was not so 
critical to Colman as was securing the $500,000.00 from the 
Appellants, so long as he had an opportunity to reacquire the 
Anderson Ranch. (F. 8; Tr. 44-46, 61-62, 93-94, 554, 739, 747-748, 
764, 812-816, 822, 829, 848, 909-911) 
Pursuant to the directions received from Archer, Wolfe and Col-
man, Allen prepared the Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partner-
ship of Solar Chemical Company for Archer and Wolfe's $250,000.00 
contribution to the salt project (Ex. 3, hereinafter the "Limited 
Partnership Agreement"), the Contract for Purchase of Real Property 
for the purchase by Appellants of the Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 
(Ex. 4, hereinafter the "Purchase Contract"), the Special Warranty 
Deed from Royalty to the Appellants (Ex. 5), and an option from 
Appellants to Colman to permit him to repurchase the Anderson Ranch 
for $600,000.00. Subsequently, and before any of these key documents 
were signed by the parties, Archer and Wolfe agreed to give Colman an 
option on the Anderson Ranch for 1-1/2 years for a purchase price of 
$650,000.00 (Ex. 8, hereinafter the "Option"). The parties never 
executed the original one (l)-year option for $600,000.00 drafted by 
Allen. (F. 9; Tr. 60, 65, 114, 137, 152-153, 162, 166, 170, 842, 
846) 
The Limited Partnership Agreement establishing Solar Chemical 
Company was dated October 15, 1981, as was Archer's initial check to 
Owanah Oil Corporation for $50,000.00 (Ex. 23). It provided for 
periodic contributions by the Limited Partners, Archer and Wolfe, 
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totalling $250,000.00, and states that Archer and Wolfe were each to 
receive a five percent (57Q) share in Solar Chemical's net profits 
over three (3) years and a one-half of one percent (.O57o) overriding 
royalty thereafter on all sodium salts recovered from the pro-
ject. (F. 10, 11) 
The Purchase Contract between Royalty and Appellants (signed by 
Colman, as President) was an executory contract for the sale of the 
Anderson Ranch to the Appellants, specifying January 4, 1982 as the 
closing date. It was dated November 9, 1981, as was Wolfe's check to 
Royalty for $100.00. The Special Warranty Deed conveying the Ander-
son Ranch from Royalty to Appellants (again signed by Colman, as 
President) was dated January 4, 1982 (Ex. 5). (F. 12, 13) 
The Option from the Appellants to Colman (Ex. 8) was dated March 
of 1982 (viz,, "this day of March, 1982"). The Option gave 
Colman the right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 
1983 for $650,000.00. It was executed by Archer, his wife, Elizabeth 
Archer, and Wolfe in their individual and respective trustee 
capacities. Archer testified that after he and Wolfe had signed the 
Option, he took it to his wife that same day, secured her signature 
and returned the same to either Mr. Colman or Mr. Allen the next day 
or the day thereafter. (F. 14; Tr. 589) 
All of the aforereferenced documents, Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 8, 
were prepared at or about the same time by Frank Allen, pursuant 
to the instructions of the parties, as part of a unified, interdepen-
dent transaction. The trial court found that they were all executed 
by the parties on the same date, most likely November 9, 1981. 
(F. 15: Tr. 44-46, 65, 76. 93-95, 114, 136, 140, 152. 162, 176, 211, 
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214, 916, 1007) Colman and his attorney required a simultaneous 
execution of the documents, particularly the Purchase Contract, the 
original Special Warranty Deed and the Option, in order to assure 
Colman of his right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch, even though 
the dates were spaced out for Appellants' tax purposes. Archer, 
likewise, was unwilling to part with his first check for $50,000.00 
prior to securing his and Wolfe's position with a contract and deed 
to the Anderson Ranch. Colman did not cash Archer's check to Owanah 
Oil in the amount of $50,000.00, dated October 15, 1981 (Exhibit 23), 
until on or about November 10, 1981, as indicated on the back of said 
check. (F. 16, 17; Tr. 65, 69, 71, 113, 162, 166, 177, 617-620, 911, 
936, 1007) 
The Option reads that it was given to Colman "in consideration 
of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and other good and 
valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged". 
The recital of "$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration" 
came from Allen, who had also inserted the same figure and language 
in the original, one-year, $600,000.00 draft option, which was never 
executed, as a legal shorthand for the true consideration between the 
parties. The fictitious $5,000.00 was carried over to the Option 
(Ex. 8), which reflects the parties' agreement to give Colman an 
option for 1-1/2 years for an additional $50,000.00 (making the total 
option price $650,000.00), which Option was executed. The parties 
never intended the $5,000.00 to be paid. It was merely window-dress-
ing which Allen pulled out of the air and inserted to give credence 
to the document. (F. 20, 21; Tr. 64, 152-156, 634-635) By the terms 
of the Option, the Appellants acknowledged their receipt of the 
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$5,000,00, even though they had not received it, because they 
knew it was not to be paid. The real consideration for the Option 
consisted of the flother good and valuable consideration11, which 
included the conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty 
Deed from Royalty to the Appellants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for 
the Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited 
Partnership profit sharing and the overriding royalty, and the 
various tax benefits accruing to the Appellants by structuring the 
total transaction their way. (F. 21, Tr. 373-379, 1007-1012, 1021) 
The Appellants represented to Colman and his attorney that the Option 
would give Colman the right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch. 
Appellants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on those 
representations and upon the sufficiency of the Option, as executed; 
and Colman did so rely and granted Appellants a deed to the Anderson 
Ranch. (F. 27; Tr. 160, 166, 301-302) 
Colman never paid $5,000.00 to the Appellants for the Option. 
Neither Archer nor Wolfe ever made any written request to Colman to 
pay the $5,000.00. When Archer and Wolfe apparently made their first 
verbal inquiry regarding payment of the $5,000.00 several months 
after the Option was signed, Colman told him that he did not believe 
he had to pay the $5,000.00. When Colman subsequently contacted 
Allen, Allen confirmed that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be 
paid inasmuch as the multiple considerations supporting the total 
deal also supported the Option. Allen consistently advised anyone 
who asked that the parties to the Option never intended for Colman to 
pay the $5,000.00. (F. 25, 26: Tr. 578, 635
 ? 924, 1006, 1012: and 
Colman Affidavit, Ex. 28) The Appellants' later trial testimony as 
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to their purported negotiations and the calculations which they 
allege resulted in the $5,000.00 consideration for the Option (Tr, 
558-568, 578, 628, 760-764, 834-837) is contradicted not only by 
Allen's testimony, Colman1s Affidavit and to some degree by Colman1s 
testimony (Tr. 152, 154-156), but also by Appellants1 own pleadings 
(viz, , paragraph 4 of their Third-Party Complaint). 
Archer and Wolfe never visited the Anderson Ranch or the Carson 
Sink salt project until the Spring of 1982 -- several months after 
they had signed their agreements with Colman. They never checked the 
title to the Carson Sink properties, nor did they ever verify the 
water rights appurtenant to the Anderson Ranch, until the Spring of 
1982. They never secured title insurance on the Anderson Ranch. 
Their overriding royalty rights in the Carson Sink still had not been 
assigned to them at the time of trial. No profits have ever been 
paid out by Solar Chemical to Archer or Wolfe. (F. 28, 29; Tr. 
486-488, 498-499, 503, 517, 784, 798) 
In the late Spring or early Summer of 1982, Miller learned from 
Archer and Wolfe that they had obtained an interest in the Anderson 
Ranch, but Miller did not at this time learn the nature of that 
interest. In August or September of 1982, Miller discussed the 
status of the Anderson Ranch with Colman, who represented to Miller 
that Archer and Wolfe's interest in the Anderson Ranch was in the 
nature of a security interest. At the same time, Colman indicated a 
desire to sell his rights in the Anderson Ranch to Miller if he could 
not secure the necessary funds. (F. 34; Tr. 219-221, 236-237) 
On November 2, 1982, Colman and his attorney, Allen, met Respon-
dent, his attorney, William L. Fillmore, and John Miller at the Salt 
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Lake Airport and reviewed and executed a certain Real Estate 
Contract between Colman and Miller (Ex. 9, hereinafter the "Real 
Estate Contract11). The Real Estate Contract assigned Colman1 s rights 
under the Option to Miller, granting Miller an independent right to 
exercise the Option and acquire 100% of the Anderson Ranch in fee 
simple on or before June 18, 1983. Colman knowingly, voluntarily and 
with advice of counsel warranted in the Real Estate Contract to 
Miller that ,fthe Option is valid and enforceable and, further, that 
it is freely assignable in its entirety without the consent or 
approval of any third party.11 (F. 35-38, Tr. 79, 142, 184) 
After Appellants received written notice from Respondents 
attorney of Colmanfs assignment of his Option rights to Respondent, 
Archer called Fillmore on or about January 4, 1983 and told Fillmore, 
among other things, that the $5,000.00 for the Option had never been 
paid by Colman. Nonetheless, Archer and Wolfe told Fillmore that 
they were still willing to sell the Anderson Ranch to Respondent if 
he would pay $655,000.00. During January and February of 1983, 
Archer, Wolfe and Fillmore engaged in negotiations for Respondent 
Miller's purchase of the Anderson Ranch; but the sale was never 
consummated because the parties could not agree upon terms (e.g., the 
down payment) and Respondent wanted a waiver from Colman of his 
rights under paragraph 4.a. of the Real Estate Contract (a limited 
option to repurchase the ranch entirely from Respondent) before 
Respondent committed his funds. (F. 42, 43; Tr. 251, 477-483) 
On April 8, 1983, Appellants attempted to revoke the Option by a 
letter to Colman (with a copy to Respondent) from Appellants' prior 
attorney, Gregory P. Williams, (Ex. 15), wherein said attorney stated 
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that "the offer has been withdrawn". On April 15, 1983, Colman, 
Allen, Respondent Miller, Fillmore, John Miller and John Clay (an 
employee of Respondent) met at Allen's office in Salt Lake to confirm 
what Allen and Colman had represented previously as to the 
history and intent behind the Option given Colman by the Appellants, 
in light of Archer and Wolfe's position on the $5,000.00 and what 
appeared to be a probability of litigation. Colman and Allen 
reaffirmed at that meeting that the $5,000.00 was never intended to 
be paid, but was a number pulled out of the air by Allen as he pre-
pared the documents, and that the series of documented transactions 
were all part of one, unified, interrelated deal by which the parties 
intended to get $500,000.00 to Colman for his salt project, make the 
Appellants secure with the Anderson Ranch and guaranty Colman the 
right to reacquire the ranch upon his payback of the $500,000.00 plus 
a $150,000.00 premium, structured in such a way as to give Appellants 
additional incentives (e.g., the royalties) and secure certain tax 
benefits important to them -- all of which comprised the true 
consideration for the deal. At the same meeting, Allen and Colman 
agreed to give Respondent their Affidavits to this effect, and did 
prepare and execute said Affidavits shortly thereafter (see Ex. 27, 
28). At the same April 15, 1983 meeting, Colman also indicated his 
willingness, after consulting further with Allen, to sign a Waiver 
and Release to permit Miller (for their mutual benefit) to purchase 
the Anderson Ranch after June 18 and on or before July 2, 1983. On 
April 19, 1983, Colman signed the Waiver and Release (Ex. 10). 
(F. 44-48, 50; Tr. 254, 320, 323-325, 485, 1187-1189, 1202-1206) 
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On April 18, 1983, Respondent Miller called Archer and offered 
to pay $650,000.00 to the Appellants for the Anderson Ranch under the 
Option. On April 20, 1983, Archer called Miller back and informed 
him of the Appellants1 rejection of Miller's offer, indicating that 
Appellants did not want to sell the property. Late in April of 1983, 
Archer and Wolfe attempted to persuade Colman to exercise his option 
rights under paragraph 4.a. of the Real Estate Contract, so that 
Archer, Wolfe and Colman could cut Respondent Miller out and sell the 
property to a third party (See Ex. 2, 56 and 74). They were 
subsequently advised by Allen, however, that the Waiver and Release 
which Colman had signed made such an attempt to prevent Respondent 
from acquiring the ranch unlawful. (F. 51, 52; Tr. 259-261, 262, 
320, 823-825, 863-868) 
On May 16, 1983, Plaintiff filed this action against the Appel-
lants and a lis pendens against the Anderson Ranch. On June 24, 
1983, the Appellants filed their Answer. Appellants filed their 
Third-Party Complaint against Colman on June 30, 1983. (F. 53) 
On July 1, 1983, Fillmore met with E. Craig Smay at the latter's 
office in Salt Lake City and tendered to Smay, as Appellants1 attor-
ney, Respondent's cashier's check to the Appellants for $650,000.00 
(Ex. 13). At said meeting the attorneys modified and signed a 
Delivery of Check and Motion and a stipulated Order (Ex. 14), with 
the express understanding that the check would be deposited in a 
Court-supervised, interest-bearing account and that !lent itlement to 
accrued interest shall be determined by the Court". Later that same 
day Fillmore filed said Delivery of Check and Motion and the Order 
with the trial court and deposited the check with the clerk of the 
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court. Respondent exercised the Option without any objection or 
protest being made by Colman either before or since. (F. 54-58, Tr. 
329, 392-397) 
The Appellants have enjoyed possession and all rights of owner-
ship of the Anderson Ranch since Respondent's July 1, L983 tender of 
the $650,000.00. The Appellants have executed leases with third 
parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch to run cattle on the 
property. All rents paid under such leases have been received by the 
Appellants. Respondent, on the other hand, has received no rents or 
income, nor has he had any other commercial benefit, from the 
Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983; nor 
has he had the use of the $650,000.00 since then. What limited and 
sporadic recreational use Respondent has had of the ranch, both 
before and after his tender offer, has been without objection by the 
prior owners or Appellants and similar to that historically enjoyed 
by many others in the area. (F. 67, 68; Tr. 216-218, 223-229, 
275-280, 288-291, 303, 358-359, 507, 522) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE 
OPTION EXERCISED BY RESPONDENT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE CONSIDER-
ATION AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT BE REVOKED BY APPELLANTS. 
A. The Option was but one important document among several 
related and interdependent documents which were negotiated, 
drafted and executed as one composite agreement with mutual, 
overlapping considerations. 
B. The recital in the Option regarding "$5,000.00 and 
other good and valuable consideration11 was simply legal short-
hand for the actual consideration exchanged between the parties 
for the total transaction. The parties never intended that 
Colman pay $5,000.00 for the Option. 
C. Because the Option was supported by sufficient consid-
eration, it was legally irrevocable for the term thereof. More-
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over, Appellants are estopped by their own actions to now deny 
the Option's validity. 
II. RESPONDENT HAS NOT ARGUED, NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT FIND, THAT 
THE TOTAL, INTERRELATED DEAL BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS A LOAN SECURED 
BY A MORTGAGE, PER SE, BUT ONLY THAT THE INTERDEPENDENT TRANSACTIONS 
WERE THE ROUGH TUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT" THEREOF AND ONLY FOR PURPOSES 
OF ILLUSTRATING THE TRUE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEAL AND THE OPTION, 
IN PARTICULAR. THUS, APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS' WITH RESPECT TO THE 
STANDARD OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE REQUIRED TO SHOW A 
MORTGAGE LOAN ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN THE 
PARTIES' INTENT CONCERNING THE TERMS AND PURPOSES OF CERTAIN WRITTEN 
DOCUMENTS. 
A. Parol evidence may be received to determine if a 
contract is integrated. And if the contract is not integrated, 
parol evidence is admissible even if it varies the terms of the 
contract. 
B. The reference in the Option to "$5,000.00 and other 
good and valuable consideration" was a mere recital, not a 
"contractual" expression of the consideration. Parol evidence 
is therefore admissible to explore the true consideration 
supporting the Option. 
C. Even if the pertinent contracts were individually 
integrated, the admission of parol evidence in this case did not 
change the terms, validity or effects of the Option or the other 
agreements, but only served to explain the parties' true 
intentions in the context of the total, unified transaction. 
D. With respect to parol and other evidence admitted, the 
relative credibility of the respective witnesses was important 
to the trial court's decisions. 
IV. THE OPTION IN ITS FINAL FORM WAS NOT AN "EXTENSION" OF A PRIOR 
BONA FIDE OPTION AGREEMENT AND, IN ANY EVENT, WAS SUPPORTED BY 
ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED COLMAN'S HANDWRITTEN NOTES 
INTO EVIDENCE FOR A LIMITED PURPOSE, AND ANY CONCERN REGARDING THEIR 
ALLEGED INCOMPLETENESS GOES ONLY TO THE WEIGHT OF SUCH EVIDENCE, 
PARTICULARLY WHERE THE COURT DID NOT REST ITS DECISION ON THE SAME. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED 
TO THE ACCRUING INTEREST ON THE TENDER SUM DEPOSITED WITH THE CLERK 
OF THE COURT AFTER APPELLANTS WRONGFULLY REPUDIATED SAID TENDER AND 
RETAINED POSSESSION OF THE RANCH. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION: APPELLANTS' BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPEAL, 
Determining the admissibility of evidence is strictly within the 
trial court's discretion and the Supreme Court will not disturb that 
decision absent abuse of discretion. Barson v. E. R. Squibbs & Sons, 
Inc., Utah. 682 P.2d 832 (1984). In the event that the trial court 
did abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court may reverse the lower 
court only if the evidence admitted was prejudicial. In Stagmeyer v. 
Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). the Court 
explained that where there was no likelihood that the testimony in 
question had any substantial bearing on the outcome of the trial 
(i.e., harmless error), it was not a cause for reversal. Prejudicial 
error occurs when the trier of fact relied on the admitted evidence 
and no other evidence exists to support the decision except that 
evidence erroneously admitted. 
With respect to determining the relative credibility of 
witnesses, the Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the primacy of 
the finder of fact in Security State Bank v. Broadhead, 52 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 36, 37 (1987) : 
"Debtor's assertion that he did not receive notification of 
the sale rests on the position that debtor's testimony was more 
credible than that of bank's witnesses. The trial court was the 
proper forum for the resolution of this issue. In order to 
successfully attack a factual finding of the trial court, an 
appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings and then demonstrate that even [when viewed] in 
the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is ~ 
insufficient to support the findings. (Emphasis added.) "Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)." 
As stated by the Court in its recent decision in Adam v<( Gubler, 
49 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 18 (1986), regarding the recent amendment to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a): 
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MFindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. (Emphasis added.) 
This principle is particularly critical in a case such as this, 
where the trial court specifically found that ffThe demeanor of all 
the witnesses was significant to the Court during this trial.11 
(F. 33) 
I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 
THE OPTION EXERCISED BY RESPONDENT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE 
CONSIDERATION AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT BE REVOKED BY APPELLANTS. 
A. The Option was but one document among several related and 
interdependent documents which were negotiated, drafted and executed 
as one composite agreement with mutual overlapping considerations. 
The trial court found that the Limited Partnership Agreement, 
the Purchase Contract, the Special Warranty Deeds and the Option were 
all parts of one unified, interdependent transaction. (F. 7, 8, 9, 
15) Frank Allen testified that the Option was executed by Archer and 
Wolfe on the same day they and Colman executed the Purchase Contract, 
the Limited Partnership Agreement and the original Special Warranty 
Deed to the Appellants. John Archer's wife, Elizabeth Archer, signed 
the Option later that same day or the next day. Allen testified that 
he had been instructed to prepare documents encompassing the total 
transaction (the limited partnership, real estate contract, deed and 
option to repurchase), but to give them different dates so as to 
oblige the Appellants with a paper trail for certain tax benefits. 
Allen testified that the parties executed the documents either on 
October 15, 1981 (the date of Ex. 3) or November 9, 1981 (the date of 
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Ex. 4) and, most likely, on the latter, (Tr. 61-63, 76, 114, 
788, 812-816) Allen's testimony about the unified nature of the 
subject transaction is corroborated in nearly all material respects 
by the Affidavit of William Colman (Ex. 28, paragraphs 2-6) and, to a 
lesser extent, in Colman1s later deposition. (Tr* 916) 
In this same context it is noteworthy that all of the original 
documents treating the Anderson Ranch contain the same error in the 
legal description (Township 10 South, instead of North). (See 
Ex. 4, 5 and 8.) The first documents to contain the correct legal 
description are the Special Warranty Deeds marked Exhibits 6 and 7. 
They were prepared and executed after Frank Allen's receipt of the 
preliminary title report (Ex. 64), which is dated November 15, 1981, 
and which Randy Cowdin, an employee of Northern TitLe Company, 
testified was mailed to Mr. Colman within a week after November 15, 
1981. (F. 23, Tr. 170-177, 205-214, 1075-1078) A careful comparison 
of the duplicate Exhibits "A" attached to both Special Warranty Deeds 
(Ex. 6, 7) with the legal description contained in the preliminary 
title report (Ex. 64) discloses that the Exhibits "A" to Exhibits 6 
and 7 are photocopies of the legal description contained in the title 
report. This suggests that the documents with the incorrect legal 
description (including the Option) were prepared and executed prior 
to receipt of the November 15 preliminary report, and that the 
revised deeds were prepared and executed subsequent to the receipt of 
that report. 
Then there is the issue of John Archer's check (Ex. 23), the 
original payment under the Limited Partnership Agreement to Owanah 
Oil in the amount of $50,000.00. Although the check is dated October 
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15, 1981, the back of the check indicates that it was deposited 
November 10, 1981, the day after the apparent November 9 execution of 
the Purchase Contract. The testimony at trial was unyieldingly 
consistent that in the Fall of 1981 Bill Colman was faced with huge 
debts and other financial problems concerning his brine operations. 
Colman had every incentive to cash any check he received from any 
source immediately, so that those funds could go directly into the 
brine operations. (Tr. 550, 911, 972) So, if he received a check 
for $50,000.00 to Owanah on October 15, reasonable men must ask why 
he would have waited almost four weeks before depositing the same? 
It is far more likely that he received the check on November 9, the 
same day all of the other original documents were executed (and when 
Appellants were secured by the Purchase Contract on the ranch), and 
that he deposited it the next day. All of the other checks received 
by Colman from Appellants on the limited partnership and the ranch 
appear to have been deposited within a day or two after Colman 
received them. 
Frank Allen testified that he would never have permitted Colman 
to execute the other documents, particularly the Purchase Contract 
and the Special Warranty Deed, until he had made certain that Colman 
was protected by a valid option to repurchase the Ranch. This con-
stitutes one more reason why the Option was executed by the parties 
on the same day as the Purchase Contract, the original Special 
Warranty Deed and the Limited Partnership Agreement: November 9, 
1981. (Tr. 65, 69, 71, 936) 
Appellants' testimony that they executed the Option on January 
4, 1982 (Tr. 760-764), is even contradicted by their own pleadings. 
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In their Third-Party Complaint against Colman, paragraph 4, they 
allege with respect to the Option: 
"Following the said purchase, in March, 1982, Third-Party 
Defendant approached the Third-Party Plaintiffs and solicited an 
option to repurchase the property.81 (Emphasis added,) 
Lastly, if the Solar Chemical investment and the Anderson Ranch 
purchase by the Appellants were truly separate deals consummated at 
different times for different purposes, common sense dictates that 
Colman would have sought the maximum sales price on the Anderson 
Ranch, not the mere $250,000.00 which the paper work suggests he 
accepted. Marcellus Palmer's appraisal (Exhibit 59) indicates that 
the fair market value of the Anderson Ranch in 1971 (10 years before 
the Appellants' purchase) was $427,000.00 (assuming zoning approval 
for development, which Archer himself contemplated). Moreover, 
Colman suggested securing the original deal for $600,000.00 with the 
Anderson Ranch. (See Ex. 1.) Colman, at least, must therefore have 
believed that it had a value of $600,000.00 (or, for that matter, 
$650,000.00 since he was willing to pay that much under the Option). 
(Tr. 644) If Colman truly intended to sell the property outright for 
the best price, one reasonably would have expected him to at least 
test the water with Respondent, whom he knew was very interested in 
obtaining the ranch; but he never even solicited a bid from the 
Miller family or anyone else. (Tr. 638-639, 945) We now know that 
Miller just one year later was willing to pay $650,000.00 for the 
Ranch. It stretches the credulity of any reasonable man to accept 
Appellants' position that the Solar Chemical investment, the Anderson 
Ranch sale and the Anderson Ranch option were three separate and 
independent transactions, particularly where the original sales price 
-19-
of the Ranch for Appellants was only $250,000.00 and the repurchase 
price for Colman only one and one-half (1-1/2) years later was set at 
$650,000.00, 
The only reasonable interpretation of these several transactions 
between Colman and the Appellants is the one found by the Court: 
they collectively comprised one deal with the purpose of getting 
Colman $500,000.00 for his brine operation and providing Appellants 
with the security of the Anderson Ranch, certain tax benefits and a 
variety of other incentives; and, but for a guaranteed option right, 
Colman would never have signed the deeds and other agreements. (See 
Findings 15, 17, 30, 31.) These findings were based on ample, 
credible evidence and should be affirmed. 
B. The recital in the Option regarding "$5,000,00 and other 
good and valuable consideration" was simply legal shorthand for the 
actual consideration exchanged between the parties for the total 
transaction. The parties never intended that Colman pay $5,000.00 
for the Option. 
It is elementary that the Option is presumed to be supported by 
valid consideration by virtue of its own language ("in consideration 
of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars [$5,000.00] and other good and 
valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged"). 
As explained in Chopot v. Foster, 318 P.2d 976 (Wash. 1957), such 
words as "for value received" in a simple written instrument create a 
presumption establishing a prima facie case of sufficient 
consideration to support the instrument. The burden then shifts to 
the Appellants to prove their own affirmative defense of failure of 
consideration. State Ex rel. Ludwick v. Bryant. 697 P.2d 858 (Kan. 
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1985); W. L, Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, Inc., 653 P.2d 791 
(Idaho 1982). Their burden is to show that there was a complete 
absence of any valid consideration to support the Option. 
It was Frank Allen's testimony that the $5,000,00 was never to 
be paid in the first place - that it was only window dressing on the 
Option, a standard recital of consideration given and acknowledged as 
having been received, an arbitrary number chosen by Allen as a 
shorthand codification of some of the benefits and "other good and 
valuable consideration11 received by Archer and Wolfe in the unified 
transaction. (Tr. 64) (See also Colman's Affidavit.) The "other 
good and valuable consideration" sufficient to support and validate 
the Option arises from the fact that the whole deal between Archer, 
Wolfe and Colman (namely, the limited partnership, the real estate 
purchase and the option) was a unified transaction with multiple, 
overlapping considerations. 
Archer and Wolfe never considered these to be separate transac-
tions. The reality behind the sophisticated documentation, as 
confirmed by Frank Allen's testimony and Bill Colman's Affidavit 
(paragraphs 2-6), is that they advanced Colman $500,000.00 for his 
brine operation in return for which they hoped, if Colman exercised 
the Option, they would get their $500,000.00 back plus a $150,000.00 
premium, or, if he failed to pay, they had title to the ranch—all in 
addition to the Limited Partnership royalties and various tax 
benefits. (Tr. 170, 373-379, 739, 788, 796, 804, 812-816, 819, 822, 
842, 846, 848, 1007) 
The issue of paying the $5,000.00 may never have come up until 
it became apparent to Archer and Wolfe that they could possibly make 
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a greater profit by selling the property to someone else or 
developing it. (Tr. 500, 515-516, 842, 846, 858-860) Archer and 
Wolfe could easily have withheld the $5,000.00 from the $250,000.00 
they paid for the ranch; but they did not. Colman testified at trial 
that he never felt he actually owed the $5,000.00, though he probably 
would have paid it just to get Archer and Wolfe off his back if he 
had had the money. Frank Allen also testified that Colman did not 
owe the $5,000.00 and that he told him so. (Tr. 578, 924, 1006-1009) 
(See also Colman1s Affidavit, paragrahs 6-7.) John Clay and John 
Miller testified that both Colman and Allen emphatically expressed 
the same positions at their April 15, 1983 meeting. (Tr. 1175-1181, 
1202-1210) 
Frank Allen testified that the initial draft of the (one-year) 
option agreement also had the $5,000.00 consideration recited there-
in. (Tr. 152, 154-156) This flatly contradicts Appellants1 and 
Colman's inconsistent testimony that the $5,000.00 was inserted in 
the final draft of the (1-1/2-year Option as a result of Appellants1 
interest calculations and negotiations with Colman relating to the 
additional 6 months. (Tr. 510-513, 558-568, 578, 628-630, 634-635, 
760-764, 819, 847, 942, 1009-1010: See also Ex. 28) Moreover, the 
not-quite-consistent testimony of Archer, Wolfe (and Colman) at trial 
is in direct contradiction to Appellants1 Third Party Complaint, 
wherein they allege at paragraph 4: 
"Following the said purchase, in March, 1982, Third-Party 
Defendant approached the Third-Party Plaintiffs and solicited an 
option to repurchase the property. Third-Party Plaintiffs 
offered Third-Party Defendant such an option for the price of 
S5 ,000.00, calculated by reference to the amount of interest 
which would accrue on the sum paid by Third-Party Plaint iffs to 
the property during the additional period they were asked to 
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hold the property at Third-Party Defendant's disposal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
According to the great weight of authority, even "a nominal 
consideration for an option is sufficient.11 Thomas v. Johnson, 55 
Utah 424, 186 P. 437, 438 (1919). This corresponds to the 
traditional "peppercorn11 of the common law. Moreover, ,BIf the 
consideration for the purchase of the property is adequate, the 
consideration of the option to purchase, however small, is binding.81 
(Emphasis added.) ^ d[. at 438. In Thomas, $1.00 was given as 
consideration for an option to purchase land for a purchase price of 
$6,500.00. Although the $1.00 consideration was nominal, the 
$6,500.00 purchase price was substantial and, thus, the option was 
held to be binding. The court reasoned that "to hold otherwise would 
be to destroy the efficacy of contracts that are made daily in the 
course of real estate, mining, and other business pursuits.11 j[d. at 
438. 
Where one of two considerations for a contract is for any reason 
insufficient, but not illegal, the other consideration, if suffic-
ient, will suffice to uphold the contract. Luther v. National Bank 
of Commerce, 98 P.2d 667 (Wash. 1940); U.S. v. Schaefer, 319 F.2d 907 
(9th Cir. 1963). Nor is consideration measured only in terms of 
money value equivalent. Gorgozo, Inc. v. Utah State Road Commission, 
553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1976). Although Mr. Colman never paid 
$5,000.00 for the Option, the "other good and valuable consideration,f 
was provided in the form of substantial tax benefits, royalties, the 
potential 20% premium on Appellants1 over-all investment and the 
deeds to the ranch--any one of which certainly exceeds the minimum 
requirement for nominal consideration. 
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In both Commuter Development Investment v. Granlich, 279 N.W.2d 
394 (Nebraska 1979), and Gerald Elbon, Inc. v. Seegren, 338 N.E.2d 
626 (Illinois 1978), the courts held that sufficient consideration 
for an option was supplied solely by the original sales transaction 
of which the subsequent repurchase option was a part. If the option 
for repurchase is reserved as part of the sales transaction, that 
transaction will supply the consideration required for the option. 
77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, §48. 
In Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758, 
760 (1904), the Court found that when a lessee, in connection with 
his lease, is also given an option to purchase the leased premises, 
the lease agreement is sufficient consideration to support the 
option, and the lessor cannot withdraw the option before its term 
expires. This was true even though the option did not specify the 
consideration that was given for it. The Court reasoned that lease 
payments made to the optionor constituted sufficient consideration 
for the option as well. This case reiterates the Court's 
longstanding view that very little consideration is needed in order 
to make an option binding and, also, that the consideration need not 
be precisely identified. 
Where the sale of land involves several connected instruments 
constituting one composite transaction, as in this case, they must be 
construed together and not as separate independent purchases or 
transactions. 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, §60. Mitchell v. 
Lawson, 444 S.W. 2d 192 (Texas 1969) and Soukop v. Snyder, 709 P.2d 
109 (Hawaii 1985) both stand for the principle that with one or more 
contemporaneous agreements between the same parties, one agreement 
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can supply consideration for another. See also Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, §80 (1981). 
In the present case, the limited partnership investment/Ranch 
purchase/option to repurchase transaction must be viewed as a whole 
and the consideration which supported the entire transaction will 
also support the Option. Allen and Colman testified that Colman used 
all the resources available to him to get the $500,000,.00. And in 
using the Anderson Ranch, which was owned by Royalty Investment 
Corp., he would never have sold it without first securing the right 
to reacquire it. 
C. Because the Option was supported by sufficient consider-
ation, it was legally irrevocable for the term thereof. Moreover, 
Appellants are estopped by their own actions to now deny the Option1s 
validity. 
As Appellants1 brief emphasizes, the Option could only be 
withdrawn by Appellants giving Colman and/or Respondent a written 
notice of intent to .withdraw and then only if there was no original 
consideration to support the Option. Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke 
Co. , supra. See also Whitworth v. Enitai Lumber Co., 220 P.2d 328, 
330 (Washington 1950). Here we have an abundance of consideration, 
outlined in great detail supra, which rendered the Option irrevocable 
through July 2, 1983. 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel can also be used as a sub-
stitute for consideration in order to make the option binding and 
irrevocable. Any individual who has made a promise which that 
individual should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
on the part of the promisee or a third person, and which does produce 
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such action or forbearance, is estopped to deny or repudiate the 
promise should the promisee or some third party suffer detriment 
thereby. Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 
1980) . These essential elements of promissory estoppel are also 
outlined in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 90(1) (1981). 
In the present case, Appellants promised Colman that he would 
have a valid option for eighteen (18) months. Colman had a right to 
rely on the consideration language, the acknowledgement of receipt in 
the Option and on Appellants1 related promise (and so did Respondent, 
as Colman1s assignee), and the Appellants should reasonably have ex-
pected such reliance. (F. 27) Nowhere in the Option itself does one 
find any reference to potential revocation by Appellants. Colman 
relied to his detriment on the Appellants1 promises and on the Option 
as executed by giving Appellants their deeds to the Anderson Ranch, 
and the Respondent by paying for an assignment of the Option. The 
Appellants should be estopped from now denying the Option's 
validity. 
II. RESPONDENT HAS NOT ARGUED, NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT FIND, 
THAT THE TOTAL, INTERRELATED DEAL BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS A LOAN 
SECURED BY A MORTGAGE, PER SE, BUT ONLY THAT THE INTERDEPENDENT 
TRANSACTIONS WERE THE ROUGH "FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT'1 THEREOF AND ONLY 
FOR PURPOSES OF ILLUSTRATING THE TRUE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEAL AND 
THE OPTION, IN PARTICULAR. THUS, APPELLANTS1 ARGUMENTS WITH RESPECT 
TO THE STANDARD OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE REQUIRED TO 
SHOW A MORTGAGE LOAN ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE. 
-26-
Appellants devote a large part of their brief to the narrow is-
sue of whether their transaction with Colman was a "secured loan11. 
Respondent asserts that the entire discussion in Section III.C. of 
Appellants' brief is irrelevant. The Court may well determine that 
the total transaction and the parties1 rough intention was, in its 
essence, a type of secured loan, but neither Respondent nor 
Appellants asked the trial court to reform all of the documents as a 
mortgage loan per se or to grant either Respondent or Appellants 
appropriate deed and mortgage-type remedies pursuant thereto; nor did 
the Court rest its decision on any finding of a secured loan per se 
(contrary to Appellants1 apparent assertions). Such an extreme 
result was not necessary because Respondent asked the trial court 
only to recognize the reality behind the original documents (i.e., a 
unified and totally interdependent transaction - aLl of which was 
negotiated, agreed upon and executed at the same time) to show that 
the various documents evidencing this unified transaction furnish 
overlapping and mutually sufficient consideration for each other and 
the Option, in particular. And the Court so found, (Findings 7-9, 
15) (See discussion in Section I.A. supra.) 
Appellants1 argument concerning a secured loan is apparently in-
tended, in part, to impose a higher standard of proof on Respondent's 
case -- the "clear and convincing evidence standard", instead of a 
simple preponderance of the evidence. But the "clear and convincing" 
standard is applicable only to strictly oral contracts for specific 
performance or to prove that an absolute conveyance is actually a 
mortgage. (See McCormick on Evidence, §340, 2d ed. , 1972.) Neither 
situation is applicable here. But see Conclusion 16.) 
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By attempting to put their reformation argument in Respondent's 
mouth, Appellants strain not only to increase Respondent's burden of 
proof, but also to divert the Court's attention to another matter not 
strictly necessary to the trial court's decision: the question of 
whether the Appellants paid inadequate consideration for the ranch 
(an element of proof for their mortgage reformation theory) and their 
related claim of the Court's inappropriate reliance on the Palmer 
appraisal (Exhibit 59). But the trial court made no specific finding 
as to the market value of the ranch, nor did it expressly rely on the 
appraisal. (Nonetheless, it is instructive that Colman offered the 
ranch as security for the whole $600,000.00 contemplated by Ex. 1, 
and was willing to pay a $650,000.00 purchase price under the Option. 
Respondent indicated his willingness to pay $650,000.00 for it just 
one year later (November 2, 1982) and Appellants turned down his 
offer in April, 1983. And there was no showing that a developmental 
zoning change was unobtainable from Cache County.) But again, 
Respondent must reiterate that such an exercise is totally irrelevant 
because neither party argued, nor did the trial court ever conclude 
(nor rely upon the theory), that the documents in question should be 
equitably reformed as a note and mortgage and enforced as such. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE TO 
EXPLAIN THE PARTIES' INTENT CONCERNING THE TERMS AND PURPOSES OF 
CERTAIN WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 
A. Parol evidence may be received to determine if a contract is 
integrated. And if the contract is not integrated, parol evidence is 
admissible even if it varies the terms thereof. 
-28-
Two recent cases by this Court re-emphasize the narrow 
exclusionary application of the parol evidence rule. In Union Bank 
v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the Court stated: 
"The parol evidence rule as a principle of contract 
interpretation has a very narrow application. Simply stated, 
the rule operates in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations 
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract. . . Therefore, a court must first determine 
whether the writing was intended by the parties to be arT" 
Integration. In resolving this preliminary question of Tact, 
l>arol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible. 
Eie v, St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d at 1194. 
"Parol Evidence is admissible to show the circumstances 
under which the contract was made or the purpose of which the 
writing was executed^ ThTFi is so even after the writing is 
determined to be an integrated contract. Admitting parol 
evidence in such circumstances avoids the judicial enforcement 
of a writing that appears to be a binding integration but in 
fact is not.11 (Emphasis added.) 
In Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc. v. Larsen 
Brothers Construction Co., 49 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (1986), the Court 
dealt with the admissibility of parol to show that an equipment 
contract, structured as a simple lease to avoid certain tax 
implications, was in reality (via verbal agreement and industry 
custom) a lease with an option to buy. The Court held as follows: 
flThe Parol Evidence Rule serves to exclude evidence of 
terms in addition to those in a written integrated agreement. 
![T]he rule operates in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations 
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract.1. . . Because the parol evidence rule 
applies only if the writing was intended by the parties to 
Represent the full and complete agreement of the parties, the 
trial court must first determine whether the writing was 
intended to be an integrated agreement^ Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 
665; Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194; Bullfrog "Marina, 28 Utah 2d at 266, 
501 PT73 at 270." 
The Court also held: 
"It is the general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous 
because of lack of clarity in the meaning of particular terms, 
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it is subject to parol evidence as to what the parties intended 
with respect to those terms, . . . We hold that that rule also 
applies where the character of the written agreement itself is 
ambiguous even though its specific terms are not ambiguous. 
Bown y. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984)," (Emphasis 
added) 
In FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 
1979) , the Court even permitted parol evidence despite an integration 
clause in the contract, and held a lease to be a sale. Parentheti-
cally, none of the critical agreements between Appellants and Colman 
contain an integration or merger clause. In the present case, the 
Trial Court received parol evidence in order to determine whether the 
parties intended the Option to be a separately integrated contract. 
The Trial Court found the pertinent documents were not individually 
integrated, but rather, were all elements of a multi-faceted, 
interdependent series of transactions comprising one deal. Thus, the 
parol evidence rule does not apply in this case and parol is 
admissable even to vary the terms of these non-integrated documents. 
As Frank Allen testified, the Appellants did not want any refer-
ence in the Option to the Carson Sink project (nor any reference in 
the Limited Partnership Agreement to the ranch transaction), because 
that might have complicated Appellants1 tax objectives. (Tr. 764, 
812-816.) But such an intent by Appellants, to give the Limited 
Partnership Agreement, the Purchase Contract and the Option the 
appearance of separate agreements for tax purposes, should not be 
permitted to impose judicial "blinders11 on this Court or the trial 
court as to the parties1 true intentions. 
B. The reference in the Option to MS5,000.00 and other good and 
valuable consideration" was a mere recital, not a "contractual" 
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expression of the consideration. Therefore, parol evidence is 
admissible to explore the true consideration supporting the Option. 
Parol evidence which varies or contradicts an unambiguous state-
ment of consideration received in a fully integrated contract is ad-
missible only when the stated consideration is a mere recital. Mere 
recitals of consideration are not conclusive, and parol evidence is 
admissible to show the real consideration. But parol evidence is 
inadmissible to vary or contradict consideration which is 
unambiguously stated as a substantial term of the contract (i.e., 
"contractual11 in nature), and not as a mere recital. Wood v. 
Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah 1978); Paloni v. Beebee, 100 Utah 115, 
110 P.2d 563 (1941); and Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 
475, 25 P.2d 952 (1933). See also Section 89B(c), Restatement of. 
Contracts (1973) . 
In the present case, the Option states that it was granted "in 
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged.11 If Appellants consider the $5,000.00 as a 
substantial, negotiated term of the Contract, then their 
acknowledgement of receipt of the $5,000.00 is binding upon them and 
may not be contradicted by parol. Respondent so objected at trial. 
(Tr. 462.) If, on the other hand, Appellants consider it a mere 
recital, then they cannot object to parol evidence explaining the 
true consideration. Such is the case with the recital language in 
the subject Option, and the trial court so found (Findings 20, 21). 
Appellants apparently want to expropriate the parol evidence 
rule as their sole province. They claim the rule permits them to 
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show that nx) consideration was paid or given (which contradicts 
the express terms of the Option), but would deny Plaintiff the 
reciprocal right to show the "other . . . consideration" which was 
given for the Option (which would not vary the terms of the 
contract). But extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict a written 
statement of consideration received is admissible when the 
consideration is stated as a mere recital. And if parol evidence is 
admissible from one party to prove non-payment in such a case, it is 
also permissible for the other party to show what unstated 
consideration was given pursuant to the language "other good and 
valuable consideration". As the Court in Paloni reasoned: 
"A recital of consideration received ... is usually intended 
merely as written acknowledgement of the distinct act of 
payment. It is there inserted for convenience and the real 
consideration is often desired not to be disclosed. Hence, it 
is not an embodiment of an act f per se' written, and may be 
disputed like any other admission." ~Tld. at 565) 
Appellants1 reliance on Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1982), is misplaced. In Rice, 
Plaintiff sold land to Defendant for $74,940.62, which consideration 
was specified in the deed and was obviously "contractual" in nature 
and, therefore, could not be varied by parol. 
Lastly, Colman and the Respondent had a right to rely on the 
recital of consideration under the circumstances, and Appellants 
should be equitably estopped to deny their acknowledgement and the 
Option's validity where Colman or Respondent would suffer detriment 
thereby. Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, supra. (And see 
Argument on promissory estoppel at pp. 24.) 
C. Even if the pertinent contracts were individually integrat-
ed, the admission of parol evidence in this case did not change the 
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terms, validity or effects of the Option, or the other agreements, 
but served to explain the parties1 true intentions in the context of 
the total, unified transaction. 
Appellants cite as their Mparol evidence rule1' what is really 
more like a statutory "best evidence rule" (1953 U.C.A. 78-25-16). 
The parol evidence rule, with its many sub-rules, historically has 
been a creature of the common law. This presumption that a written 
contract contains the full agreement of the parties is very limited. 
Among other things, it does not apply where the writing is manifestly 
fragmentary, intended to be only a partial integration of the 
agreement, ambiguous or uncertain. Under such circumstances, parol 
evidence is admissible to explain the parties' intent. Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983). The Option here discloses 
that "other good and valuable consideration" was received, but fails 
to identify what that consideration was. Even if the Court were to 
ofind that the Option was integrated within itself, parol evidence is 
still admissible to explain what this other consideration was, 
because a mere explanation does not by itself vary such a recital. 
Wood v. Roberts, supra. The same principle justifies an inquiry into 
the full consideration given to Colman by Appellants for the Special 
Warranty Deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7), which also recite "other good and 
valuable consideration." As the Court stated in Wood v. Roberts; 
". . . the deed itseLf specified the consideration to be 
f$10.00 and other good and valuble consideration1, and evidence 
is admissible to show what: that consideration was." Jjd. at 407. 
Significantly, the Court did not limit its holding to recitals 
involving only "nominal" consideration, but without qualification 
allowed parol evidence to show the true consideration. In the 
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present case, the parol evidence admitted by the Trial Court on 
the issue of consideration did not vary the terms of or alter the 
Option or the other agreements. It merely explained the true 
consideration supporting them all. 
The Option, Limited Partnership Agreement, Purchase Contract and 
Special Warranty Deeds were in no way impaired by the parol evidence 
admitted and are still valid and enforceable agreements within the 
context of the larger, unified transaction, as the parties intended. 
The different effective dates of the various agreements remain 
unchanged, because the parol evidence admitted showed only that the 
pertinent agreements were executed on the same day. Appellants argue 
that parol evidence has changed the consideration for the Limited 
Partnership Agreement and the Purchase Contract; but Appellants are 
unclear as to how, even if it were true, this affects any of the 
trial courtfs findings. No party advocates the invalidity of the 
Limited Partnership Agreement or the Purchase Contract, and 
Respondent does not argue any absence of consideration for them. The 
real issue is the Option1s validity, which Respondent asserts rests 
on mutual consideration as between the component transactions. 
Indeed, Appellants produced no evidence to show that they had lost 
anything they had bargained for -- no doubt because they received 
everything they were promised (excluding the $5,000.00 only -- which 
was not promised). Appellants1 reference to Tarr v. Hicks, 393 P.2d 
557 (Colo. 1964), is not on point because Tarr dealt with the 
settlement of a will and a party's efforts to vary the terms of 
certain documents in such a way as would effectively destroy them. 
No one in this case seeks to destroy or limit the Limited Partnership 
Agreement or the Special Waranty Deeds, as Appellants' brief implies. 
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Respondent argues not that they are invalid, but that they are valid 
and, more to the point, that the Option is necessarily valid also. 
Appellants produced neither law nor evidence establishing any 
loss of tax benefits due to Respondent's (or the Court"s) construc-
tion of their deal with Colman. The court below made no findings as 
to any tax sham; and Respondent's own expert witness, William Crosby, 
could find nothing illegal about the deal's tax structure. But the 
trial court did find the tax structure to be a key to discerning the 
deal's true nature. (Findings 8, 21; Tr. 382, 796, 812-816, 848) 
D. With respect to parol and other evidence, the relative 
credibility of the respective witnesses was important to the Trial 
Court's decisions. 
The trial court's Findings 32 and 33, among others, illustrate 
the significant role played by the respective witnesses' credibility 
and demeanor in the court's final decisions. In that regard, it is 
necessary to highlight both the importance and the veracity of Frank 
Allen's testimony. He was not only present at some of the parties' 
discussions, and not only prepared all of the pertinent documents for 
this complicated transaction, but he is also the only witness who is 
in a position to give neutral, disinterested testimony. He had no 
interest in the outcome of this litigation, nor any interest in the 
Anderson Ranch. Moreover, if he had any bias in these proceedings, 
one would expect a desire to protect his friend and client, Bill 
Colman. Nonetheless, Allen's testimony on many critical points 
directly contradicted Colman's trial testimony. Now that Colman has 
altered his position in several significant respects, Allen is the 
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only contrary voice to Appellants1 convenient reconstruction of the 
or ig inal negot iat ions . 
Allen's testimony has been consistently mischaracterized by 
Appellants1 editorializing, and much of Appellants1 commentary on Mr. 
Allen1s testimony comes by way of sweeping generalities, neatly over-
looking other aspects of his testimony. The entire certified tran-
script of Frank Allen's trial testimony leaves little doubt as to his 
recollection on the critical factual issues of this case and, unlike 
Colman, his recollection has not changed with time. In this light, 
Appellants strongly urge the Court's verbatim review of Allen's trial 
testimony. (Tr. 38-215, 1005-1030) Pertinent excerpts from the 
transcript of Frank Allen's trial testimony which are particularly 
supportive of the trial court's findings include: Tr. 54, 57-58, 66, 
133 (value of the Ranch); Tr. 44-46, 93-95 (Allen's instructions); 
Tr. 61-62 (spacing the dates of the documents); Tr. 64, 154-156, 
1009-1010 (the source of the $5,000.00 consideration figure); Tr. 86, 
87, 185 (Allen's work on the Affidavits); Tr. 68, 71, 114, 160, 166, 
170, 177 (interdependence of the Solar Chemical, Anderson Ranch and 
Option deals); Tr. 152, 1021 (the one year option); Tr. 64, 113-114, 
141, 160, 1007 (the "other consideration"); and Tr. 65, 69, 76, 162, 
170, 205-214, 1021 (concurrent execution of the original 
agreements). 
Frank Allen testified that he prepared the documents pursuant to 
instructions received at various times from Archer, Wolfe and Colman, 
and that he participated in meetings with all of them concerning 
those same documents. Allen has been a member in good standing of 
the Utah Bar for more than 35 years with a great deal of real 
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property experience (Tr. 38), and his testimony reflected an 
excellent knowledge of the law pertaining to real estate documentso 
Mr. Allen testified honestly to the best of his recollection, as a 
matter of duty and in consequence of the oath under which he gave 
that testimony, regardless of whom it may have helped or hurt, his 
own client not excluded• 
By way of contrast, the Court should also consider the actions 
and testimony of Bill Colman. As indicated by the testimony of John 
Miller, John Clay, Respondent, Fillmore and Allen, in addition to 
Colman1s own Affidavit and personal notes, Colman1s statements were 
consistent with Allen's recollection of events until this action was 
filed. Then Colman1s recollection began to change. (Tr. 1069) 
Colman1s Affidavit, which was admitted by the Court for all purposes, 
and which Frank Allen testified was the product of a lengthy meeting 
and close review by both of them in his office in April 1983, is a 
very compelling document, and one which directly contradicts much of 
Colman1s trial testimony. (Tr. 86-87) It was also prepared and 
signed at a time when Colman1s recollection of events was much 
fresher than when he testified at trial 2-1/2 years later. 
Colman1s testimony was also impeached directly by his own notes* 
(See Exhibit 54, wherein Colman writes regarding the "Archer and 
Wolfe/Colman11 deal, such interesting notations as "Interest is his 
fundamental consideration;" "these are purely counterfeit complaint -
like the $5,000.00; Purchase of Land never intended to be bona fide 
sale - gimmick to satisfy E;" "Shylock;" "it was a loan to be collat-
eralized by pledging the Ranch - $500,000.00 at 20% for 18 months." 
In Exhibit 55, dated July 14, 1982, Colman writes, among other 
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Ranch a year after the Option was to expire, or whether it was 
turning on his old friend Miller, first, to discuss the advantages of 
collaborating with Archer and Wolfe to defeat Miller's interests in 
April, 1983 or, secondly, to pick up a mere $5,000,00 from Archer and 
Wolfe (and whatever side deals they may have made) to defeat Miller's 
interest in July, 1984, his surprising flip-flop with respect to his 
private interests and his testimony is remarkable. So is the steady 
stream of direct contradictions in his trial testimony, as measured 
against his prior Affidavit, his Deposition, statements made by him 
to the Respondent, John Miller, Clay and Fillmore, and his personal 
notes. His testimony in this case was impeached on almost all fronts 
and the trial court had ample basis to reject his testimony. 
As for Appellants, their motivation in this matter appears quite 
simple: how to make the most money. Appellants1 primary motivation 
has been to avoid the Option so that they could deal independently 
with third parties. They had already driven an extremely hard bar-
gain with Bill Colman in 1981, extracting multiple concessions when 
Colman had his back against the wall (Tr. 744), including split pro-
fits and an overriding royalty on the brine operation and a potential 
twenty percent (20%) profit on their total investment of $500,000.00,, 
Yet they were determined to seek yet additional profits at Miller's 
expense by repudiating the Option. On two separate occasions they 
tried to use Colman to defeat Miller's right to the ranch, but both 
attempts failed because they were unlawful. In short, greed has been 
Appellants' animating spirit from start to finish and they have never 
viewed contractual obligations as any kind of impediment. Their 
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included an agreement (never produced and not before the Court) to 
give Colman a one-year option on the Ranch with a purchase price of 
$600,000.00. There was no testimony by any witness at trial that the 
document was ever signed. To the contrary, Allen confirms that it 
was not executed. The reason for this was acknowledged by all: 
prior to execution of the option (and the other key contracts), 
Colman determined that he needed a longer option term, so the parties 
agreed to an eighteen-month option. The only changes he made from 
the original draft to the final Option were Appellants' promise to 
give Colman an extra six (6) months and Colman1s promise to pay an 
extra $50,000.00 if he exercised it. 
It is specious for Appellants to argue that a mere draft docu-
ment, which was never executed by any party, somehow constituted an 
agreement for which specific consideration was given. If it was 
never entered into, how could any consideration have been given for 
it? And if it was never a valid, binding agreement because no one 
signed it, and no consideration was ever given for it, how can anyone 
now argue that the final product of the parties' negotiations, which 
included an eighteen-month option, must somehow reflect "additional" 
consideration? We simply are not dealing with the extension of a 
fully executed, legally binding, prior agreement. Appellants' novel 
theory, carried to its logical conclusion, would require parties to 
any final contract to show original and additional consideration for 
each successive draft of their agreement up to and including the 
executed version. But how can one extend an option which was 
never granted in the first place? Respondent knows of no law 
supporting that proposition, and Appellants cite none. 
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edit those copies, of the individual notes, that he stapled them 
according to his best judgment concerning their apparent relationship 
to each other, that he and his firm possessed copies of no other 
notes than those produced at trial, and that the originals were all 
returned to Colman with the file. (Tr. 1106-1113, 1145-1161, 
1187-1188, 1196-1199) There was no evidence adduced by Appellants at 
trial to contradict Fillmore's testimony, nor to justify the 
gratuitous aspersion in Appellants' brief regarding the possibility 
of "mishandling by counsel" or "partisan editing". Although Colman 
was asked by the Court, and counsel for both Respondent and 
Appellants, to produce the original notes, he subsequently claimed he 
could not locate them (Tr. 975). Thus, the Court correctly accepted 
all copies produced by Respondent under the Best Evidence Rule. 
Appellants failed to specifically request discovery of any such 
notes. Respondent's counsel understood the verbal pretrial arrange-
ment on documents to cover only the parties' cases-in-chief, not 
potential rebuttal material. These notes were not used in Respon-
dent's case-in-chief, but to rebut Colman's testimony for Appellants' 
case when he was cross-examined by Respondent's attorney. Any undue 
surprise was overcome by the several days that Colman and Appellants 
had to review the notes after their initial introduction and prior to 
Colman's testifying about them. (Parenthetically, Appellants 
introduced documents in their case-in-chief which had not been 
previously disclosed to Respondent (Defendants' Exhibits 63 and 65), 
although the same had been formally requested by Respondent 
previously.) 
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asserts that he is still entitled to all the accrued interest as a 
matter of law. 
To grant Appellants the interest on the tender they repudiated, 
when they have also had the full commercial benefit of the land for 
the entire pendency of these proceedings, would be a grossly unfair 
double benefit. Since Respondent's tender on July 1, 1983, the only 
benefit which he has enjoyed from the property has been the same 
benefit which he had enjoyed for 20-30 years- -- sporadic recreational 
use with permission of the prior owners and Appellants. As 
Respondent and Colman testified, this permissive recreational usage 
is no different than that which has been enjoyed historically by many 
other non-owners on the ranch. (And even that limited usage by 
Respondent abated for more than a year for Miller's L.D.S. mission in 
Africa during the pendency of this litigation prior to trial.) 
(Finding 68; Tr. 216-217, 230, 303) 
The location of a small fishing trailer on the north edge of the 
ranch, which was situated there for many years before Appellants ac-
quired title to the land, and which is hardly ever used by Respondent 
(Tr. 224-225, 288, 596-597), can by no stretch of the legal imagina-
tion constitute "possession" of the 1,840 acre ranch under Pack v. 
Hull Development Co., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1983), cited by Appellants. 
At most, Respondent has enjoyed a permissive license from past and 
present owners for limited recreational use in exchange for his 
assistance regarding trespassers (the locked gate), fences, etc. 
Respondent has had a key to the gate for many years with the owners' 
permission (as have the prior owners and Appellants). Appellants 
could have changed the locks any time they wished. (Tr. 225, 227, 
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running cattle on their property -- a far cry from Respondent having 
the right to run cattle on his own property without paying rent to 
anyone or feeling free to develop the ranch without the risk of later 
losing his investment by losing this suit. 
In short, Respondent has lost the use of his money during the 
pendency of this litigation. He has had no commercial use of the 
land. And he has had no recreational use beyond what he previously 
had and what others have had on a limited basis, and his limited 
usage has never been adverse to or without permission of the owners. 
Appellants have had the full commercial benefit and ownership of the 
land. They have not been restricted by Mr. Miller in any way from 
renting the land to other third parties and have taken all the rents 
and profits received from third parties' use of the land since 
Respondent's tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983. As the trial 
court found: 
"The Defendants have enjoyed possession and all rights of 
ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Plaintiff's July 1, 1983 
tender of the $650,000.00, The Defendants have executed leases 
with third parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch, most 
recently with Boyd Munnsf to run cattle on the ranch property. 
All rents paid under such leases have been received by the 
Defendants. 
"In contrast to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has received 
no rents or income, nor has he had any other commercial benefit, 
from the Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00 on July 
1, 1983; nor has he had the use of his money since then. What 
limited and sporadic recreational use Plaintiff has had of the 
ranch has been without objection by the owners and similar to 
that enjoyed historically by many others in the area." 
The statements in Appellants' brief at pages 28-30 that "no use 
of the land has been made by Appellants without Respondent's con-
sent"; that Respondent "did on (the ranch) all he would have done had 
his ownership been undisputed"; and references to Respondent's "ex-
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unlimited. If they chose to do no more than lease the land, that was 
their decision and even that was more than Respondent could do with 
the land during the pendency of this case. Appellants8 Amended 
Answer in the case denies that Respondent has any right to the 
Anderson Ranch, Appellants should not be allowed to profit from 
their own wrongful refusal to honor their Option agreement. 
Appellants1 startling allegation at page 30 of their brief that, 
,fIn the circumstances, it was merely vindictive not to award interest 
to Appellants/1 (emphasis added), is demeaning to the trial judge 
and without basis in fact. Judge Call acted with utmost integrity 
throughout this lengthy and difficult proceeding. To impugn his 
integrity is an affront to the bench. 
Common law and equity require that if a party obligated to sell 
land still retains possession and the right to rents and profits, and 
refuses and delays the buyer's right to purchase, forcing the buyer 
to place funds on deposit with the Court pending settlement of the 
action, then that seller is not entitled to the accrued interest on 
the deposited funds. To hold otherwise would give the seller a 
double recovery -- i.e., both rents and profits and the interest. 
See Resnick v. Goldman, 133 S.2d 770 (Fla. 1961) and Palm Beach 
Estates v. Crocker, 143 S. 792 (Fla. 1932), which both held that it 
would be inequitable for the seller to collect interest on money 
deposited with the Court during the period of litigation when the 
seller was responsible for the delay in conveyance of the property. 
See also, Rasmussen v. Moe, 292 P.2d 226, 230 (Cal. 1956), where the 
buyer placed a deposit of $10,000.00 in Court and the seller refused 
to convey land, the buyer was awarded interest on the deposit. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
On appeal, the burden is upon the Appellant to convince the 
Court that the trial court committed substantial, reversible error, 
not that the Appellant should have won the case. Brigham v. Moon 
Lake Electric Assoc., 470 P.2d 393, at 394 (Utah 1970), The trial 
court's judgment in this case was amply supported by the evidence, is 
wholly within the law, and should be affirmed in its entirety, 
granting Respondent the specific performance he sought nearly four 
(4) years ago, along with the interest accrued on his tender sum 
since Appellants' wrongful rejection of the same, and his costs on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this of March, 1987. 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT ™ T"T ^ T"<^ TT'TIAL H T S T E ™ OF THE 
STATE Oi UI / i l l , AA1 LXi-ILS t V l V THE GOUNll \- /1 v/ ^"i U i i A-. 
ERNEST J . MILLER, 
)N ft HOGGAN 
IRNEYS AT LAW 
WEST CEIVTER 
O BOX 5 2 5 
.N UTAH 8 4 3 2 ' 
(11 7 5 2 - 1 5 5 1 
VS . 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH 
B. ARCHER, both individually and 
as Trustees for t.he ELizabeth 
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT 
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 7" 
Defendants. 
JOHN u . -UV^ULK and L i_ l^Abhln 
B. ARCHER. r>otn i n d i v i d u a l l y 
ds T r u s t e e s fo r t h e E l i z a b e t h 
Daly A r c h e r T r u s t , and Hl'BF r 1 
wOLFE. JUDY W. WOLFE, an,: L . . . . . 
•vOLFE. J.S T r u s t e e s for EJ ; ; 11 
'.v.: 1 i" e I r ... s f v 7 
T h i r d - P a r t y P l a i n t i f f s , 
WILLlAr- J . COLMAN, 
T h i r d - P a r t y D e f e n d a n t . 
i 1NDINGS 01 1 A«j; 
:-W 
C i v i l No. 21692 
R . : ^ " O H 4 £ - J - 3" 
,1 
000.* 
^ ? : AUG 1 2 ' 3 3 5 
J 0 0 3 S£THS.flU£W, Clerk 
*!t fettd*. Deputy 
THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the above-
entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call District Judge, 
presiding and sitting without a jury, on September 18. 19, 20 27 
October 3, November 14, and December 17. 1985- and Plaintiff 
having been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggan 
of Olson & Hoggan, and the Defendants having been represented by 
their counsel of record, E. Craig Smay. and the Third-Party 
Defendant, knowingly, voluntarily and after discussing the same 
with the Court, having been represented by himself- and the Court 
having heard testimony from witnesses for ail the parties hereto, 
and having received and accepted certain exhibits offered by the 
parties as evidence in the matter- and the Court having received 
trial briefs *£rom counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants oi 
the primary issues before the Court- and the Court having made an< 
entered its written Memorandum Decision herein, and having 
reviewed and considered Plaintiff's proposed Findings, Conclusion* 
and Judgment and Defendants1 Objections thereo* and being fully 
advised in the premises, THE COURT DOES NOW MAKE AND ENTER THE 
FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
>N & HOGGAN 
JRNEYS AT LAW 
NEST CENTER 
O BOX 5 2 5 
iN. UTAH 84321 
>1)752-1551 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
lo The real property which is the subject of this action by 
Plaintiff for specific performance of a purchase option relating 
to said property is a composite of several semi-contiguous parcels 
of undeveloped land and appurtenant water rights located Southeast 
of Paradise. Utah, comprising in the whole 1840.14 acres, more or 
less, primarily used for cattle grazing and recreation, and 
generally known and referred to hereinafter as the "Anderson 
Ranch". which property is located totally within the boundaries of 
Cache County. Utah, and more particularly described as follows 
Parcel I: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter-
the South half of the Northeast quarter the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter- the East half of the 
Southeast quarter- the Northwest quarter of the Soutnwest 
00 ri,J»Jlii 
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quarter of Section 26- the North haLf of the 
Northwest quarter the Southwest quarter of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 25* the Northeast quarter of the 
Northeast quarter- the Northeast quarter of the Southeast 
quarter- the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter, the 
South haLf of the Southwest quarter of Section 24' the 
Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 23* in 
Township LO North, Range 3 East. SaLt Lake Base and Meridian 
Lots 2, 3 and 4 the Southeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter* and 
the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 19 
Township LO North. Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Mer id ian. 
Pa£C_e_l_2; The West half of the Southeast quarter and the 
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26. Township 1( 
North. Range 3 East. SaLt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Farce L 3 The Northeast quarter- the Southeast quarter of 
the Northwest quarter: the Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter• the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 19. the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the 
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in 
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the 
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26* 
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
ParceL 4; The West half of the Northeast quarter; the 
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter and the Southeast 
quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10 
North, Range 4 East, SaLt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Together with all water rights /apptrrtroaan-fr- to the above-
described property. </ 
2. The Plaintiff herein, Ernest Junior Miller (hereinafter 
"MiiLer"), is a resident of Cache County. Utah. The Defendants 
named herein, both as individuals and as trustees, John D. Archer 
(hereinafter "Archer"), Elizabeth B, Archer, Elliott Wolfe 
(hereinafter "Wolfe"), Hubert Wolfe and Judy W Wolfe, are all 
residents of Salt Lake County. Utah. The Third-Party Defendant 
DN&HOGGAN
 h t William J. Colman (hereinafter "Colman") , is also a 
DRNEYSATLAW N 7 7 
WEST CENTER 
' O BOX 5 2 5 
AN. UTAH 8 4 3 2 1 
0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 1 5 5 1 
0>J •••«.Jv^' j 
resident of SaLt Lake County, Utah. Miller. Colman, Archer 
and Wolfe are men of considerable business experience and acumen 
particuarly m matters of cattle raising and beef fabrication 
(Miller), mining, oil and gas (Colman and Archer) and real estat 
(Archer, Wolfe and Colman). -Arebtrr and Wolfe are-nieu of 
c-cnsrdes^ a-b-l-e—&4«^ xu^ air^ IfB^ TaTrc e 
3. Colman is a shareholder and President of Royalty 
Investment Corporation, also known as Royalty Investment Company 
(hereinafter "Royalty11), a Utah corporation. Most, if not all, 
owned by Colman's relatives- ai the balance-of .Royalty s stock, is 
the company is. witnm Colman s efl 
DN & HOGGAN 
DRNEYS AT LAW 
WEST CENTER 
»0 BOX 525 
\H UTAH 84321 
31)752 1551 
thin ' ffective control. Colman acquirt 
the Anderson Ranch for Royalty is^^Sir by purchasing E. H. Camerc 
and H. C. Anderson's rights (as Buyers) under a June 1961 Contrac 
of Sale with LaMar Anderson and Lucille Anderson (as Sellers). 
4. In the late Summer or early Fall of 1981, Colman ap-
proached Defendant Archer for a loan of $750,000.00, money which 
Colman urgentLy needed to continue development of the Carson Sini 
salt project (certain mineral rights and evaporation ponds used 
for commercial salt production located in Nevada),. Said mineral 
project was owned by Owanah Oil Corporation, of which Colman was 
President, and was in serious financial trouble due, at least in 
part, to excessive precipitation in the past. 
5. Subsequently, Archer advised Colman that Archer and 
Wolfe, with whom Archer had discussed Colman1s offer, were not 
interested in a simple Loan and were not interested in investing 
A!TOgg^4^aH^-^Q#T;€rQfrr5& in any event. Colman suggested that Jthsa 
A J*4* $&&B^&&&?&®. could be secured by the Anderson 
Ranch (indicating that Colman. at least, beLieved the ranch nad 
that much value). The possibility of a limited partnership 
interest in the Carson Sink salt project was also discussed. 
6. Based upon these preliminary discussions. Colman had his 
long-time attorney, Frank J. Allen, of Salt Lake City Utah 
(hereinafter "Allen"), prepare a document (Exnibit 1) by which 
Archer and Wolfe would invest S600.000.00 in a limited partnershi 
for the Carson Sink project, which investment Colman would secure 
-5-
with a Trust Deed on the Anderson Ranch. Said document was 
never executed. 
7. Subsequently and after considering certain tax savings 
possibilities with tneir accountants. Archer and WoLfe advised 
CoLman that they were only interested in advancing Coiman 
$500,000.00 total for his salt project, and this on condition tha 
the $500,000,00 be structured to appear by record as an investmen 
of $250,000.00 in a Limited partnership on the salt project, 
providing tax write-offs for research and development expenses, 
and an interest in profits during the Life of the partnership and 
an overriding royalty thereafter; and with the other $250,000.00 
to be shown as the purchase price for the Anderson Ranch, coupled 
with a one-year option in CoLman to reacquire the Ranch for 
$600,000.00, which would permit Defendants to treat the differenc 
as a capital gain. Archer, Wolfe and Coiman reached an agreement 
in principle on this arrangement, and Defendants accepted Coiman' 
suggestion that Allen draw up the necessary papers to document th 
deal. 
8. In October and/or November of 1981, Archer, Wolfe and 
Coiman met with ALLen at the latterfs office on at least two 
separate occasions, first to discuss their agreement and later to 
execute the documents prepared by Mr. Allen pursuant to their 
instructions. AiLen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and Coiman that 
although the primary purpose of the arrangement was to get 
$500,000.00 to Coiman for his salt project, they wanted the deal 
structured such that it would appear as three separate 
transactions (i.e., the limited partnership, the purchase of the 
ft ranch, and the option back on the ranch), aq_ as—~to~ 1 p. ave * ""pfggfc-
? K~-^ rra3=E33r^feS^=3^ and secure Archer and Wolfe all the tax 
advantages they were seeking. The structure of the deal was not 
so critical to Coiman as securing the $500,000.00 from the 
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was willing to use the various resources within his control to 
consummate a deal any way he could. 
9. Pursuant to the directions received from Archer, Wolfe 
and Colman. ALlen prepared the Certificate and Agreement of 
Limited Partnership of Solar Chemical Company, for Archer and 
Wolfe1s $250,000.00 contribution to the salt project (Exhibit 3? 
hereinafter the "Limited Partnership Agreement'1) , the Contract f< 
Purchase of Real Property, for the purchase by Defendants of the 
Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 (Exhibit 4, hereinafter the 
"Contract'1) , the Special Warranty Deed from Royalty to the 
Defendants (Exhibit 5), and an option from Defendants to Colman I 
permit him to repurchase the Anderson Ranch for $600,000.00. 
Subsequently, the parties agreed to give Colman an option on the 
Anderson Ranch for 1-1/2 years for a purchase price of $650,000.( 
(Exhibit 8, hereinafter the "Option"). The original one (l)-year 
option for $600,000.00 was, never executed by the parties. 
10. The Limited Partnership Agreement establishing Solar 
Chemical Company was dated October 15, 1981, as was Archer's 
initial check to Owanah Oil Corporation, the General Partner in 
Solar Chemical Company, for $50,000.00 (Exhibit 23). Colman was 
shareholder and President of Owanah, which company apparently was 
within his effective control. 
11. The Limited Partnership Agreement provided for periodic 
contributions by the Limited Partners. Archer and Wolfe, totallin 
$250,000.00, and states that Archer and Woife were each to receiv 
a five percent (57o) share in Solar Chemical's net profits over 
three (3) years and that each would receive a one-half of one 
percent (#&#5%) overriding royalty thereafter on all sodium salts 
recovered from the project. 
12. The Contract between Royalty (signed by Colman, as 
President), as Seller, and Archer, Archer's wife and Wolfe, as th 
sole named Trustee of Elliott Wolfe Trust 701 (hereinafter the 
"Wolfe Trust"), as Purchasers, was an executory contract for the 
sale of the Anderson Ranch to tne Defendants, specifying January 
4, 1982 as the closing date. It was dated November 9, 1981. 
as was Wolfe's check to Royalty for $100.00 (Exhibit 35). 
- 7 -
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13. The Special Warranty Deed conveying the Anderson Ranch 
from Royalty (again signed by CoLman, as President), to the 
Defendants was dated January 4, L982 (Exhibit 5). Said Special 
Warranty Deed, as well as the Contract and the Option, aLl contair 
a scrivinor's error in the legal description of the Anderson 
Ranch, mistakenly and unintentionally referencing Township 10 
South, instead of Township 10 North, in Parcel 3 thereof. No 
evidence was received (or offered) suggesting that Colman acted 
without authority in executing the Contract, the Special Warranty 
Deed or subsequent deeds as President .of Royalty Investment (x 
Corporation. The documents^a^Eax I 11 In il i 1^  IJJ I fru 11 T I M 
14. The Option from the Defendants to Colman was dated Marct" 
of 1982 (viz, Mthis day of March, 1982"). The purpose of 
said Option was to allow Colman the right to reacquire the Ander-
son Ranch on or before July 2, 1983 for $650,000.00. It was 
executed by Archer, Mrs. Archer and Wolfe in their individual and 
respective trustee capacities. Tfaeir eyxrcutriun uf Llie Option ^ . 
coxx-etrprrmts— precisely with liow Lliey took title to the "Anderson .y 
Rinjch--^g<g^^ Q'^anS::frf\ 
15. All of the aforereferenced documents, Exhibits 3, 4, 5 
and 8, were prepared at or about the same time by Frank Allen, 
pursuant to the instructions of the parties, as part of a unified, 
integrated transaction. They were all executed by the parties on 
the same date, most likely on or about November 9, 1981, as 
indicated on the back of said check. 
16. Although Colman was in debt and had an acute need for 
funds to continue his salt project, Archers1 check to Owanah Oil 
in the amount of $50,000.00, dated October 15, 1981 (Exhibit 23), 
was not cashed by Colman until on or about November 10, 1981, as 
indicated on the back of said check. 
17. Colman and his attorney, Allen, required a simultaneous 
execution of the documents, particularly the Contract, the 
originaL Special Warranty Deed and the Option, in order to assure 
that Colman was protected as to his right to reacquire the 
Anderson Ranch, even though the dates were spaced out for 
Defendants1 tax purposes. The Court finds it probable that 
Archer, likewise, was unwilling to part with his first check for 
$50,000.00 prior to securing the Defendants' position with a 
contract and deed on the Anderson Ranch. Allen insisted that the 
-8-
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LimLted Partnership Agreement, Contract and Option be executed 
at the same time so that CoLman would not be deeding away the 
Anderson Ranch without a right to repurchase the same. Such an 
entitlement was always part of the parties1 agreement and 
essential to Colman's willingness to enter into the related 
transactions. Colman was promised that right to repurchase the 
Ranch as part of the total deal and re Lied on that promise in 
executing the deed conveying the Ranch to Defendants. 
L8. Elliott Wolfe represented to Colman and Allen that he 
had authority to sign any agreement for his trust and intended 
that his signature bind the trust and that Colman and Allen rely 
thereon*, and Colman and ALlen did rely upon his representation ai 
signature. Mrs. Archer's signature was secured the same day th« 
the other parties signed the Option, or the very next day. The 
Option was then delivered by Archer, either that same day or the 
next day, to Colman. 
19. AlLen never received a copy of the Wolfe Trust agreemer 
from Wolfe (nor was it produced at trial) : nor did the other 
ostensible trustees to the Wolfe Trust, Hubert Wolfe and Judy 
Wolfe, ever notify Colman, Allen or Miller that they objected to 
Wolfe's binding the Trust by his signature alone- nor did Wolfe 
seriously claim that he lacked authority to bind the Wolfe Trust. 
20. The Option reads that it was given to Colman lfin 
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged'1. This recital of $5,000.00 and the "other good and 
valuable consideration" came from Allen, who had aLso inserted th 
same figure in the original, one-year, $600,000.00 option to 
Colman. which was never executed. The fictitious $5,000e00 
consideration was carried over to the Option (Exhibit 8), which 
reflects the parties' agreement to give Colman an option for 1-1/ 
years for an additional $50,000.00 (total. $650,000.00), wnich 
Option was executed. 
21. Said $5,000.00 was never intended by the parties to be 
paid. It was merely window-dressing which Allen pulled out of th 
air and inserted to give credence to the document as part of the 
legal shorthand he used for the actual consideration. The 
G'J^. 
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Defendants acknowledged receipt of the same, even though they 
had not actually received $5,000.00, because they all knew it was 
not to be paid. The real consideration for the Option consisted 
of the flother good and valuable consideration11, which included th< 
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed from 
Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for the 
Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited 
Partnership benefits as to profit sharing and the overriding 
royalty, and the various tax benefits accruing to the Defendants 
by structuring the total transaction their way. The Court finds 
that it was never the intent of the parties at the time the Optioi 
was granted that $5,000.00 was the consideration for the Option, 
or that the $5,000.00 would, in fact, ever be paid. 
22. The Court notes that the Option on its face and by its 
terms gives the Defendants no right of revocation. There are no 
restrictions on its face as to its assignability by Colman to 
third parties, nor is there any language suggesting the Option wa* 
strictly personal to Colman. 
23. Within a week after November 15, 1981, the date of a 
title commitment from Northern Title Company (Exhibit 64), said 
report was mailed to Colman or Allen by said title company. This 
title report, among other things, disclosed an error in the legal 
description of the Anderson Ranch, as set forth in paragraph 13 oi 
these Findings. Two Special Warranty Deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7) 
were subsequently prepared for the purpose of conveying the 
Anderson Ranch from Royalty to the Defendants with the necessary 
correction to the legal description (i.e., changing "Township 10 
SouthM to "Township 10 North" for Parcel 3). They were dated 
January 4, 1982, and recorded by Allen on January 7, 1982. The 
new Special Warranty Deed for the Wolfe interest (Exhibit 7) in 
the Anderson Ranch was conveyed to "Elliott Wolfe, Trustee of the 
Elliott Wolfe Trust No. 701", and so recorded, without any 
preference to co-trustees. 
24. On January 22, 1982, a Correction of Correction Deed 
(Exhibit 45) was executed by Lucille Anderson to Royalty, and 
thereafter recorded to correct the error contained in the 
r > 
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legai description ot the 1980 deed from her and her husband to 
Royalty for the Anderson Ranch. 
25. Colman never paid $5,000.00 to tne Defendants for the 
Option. iSleither Archer nor Wolfe ever made any written request 
Colman to pay the $5,000.00. When Archer made his first verbal 
inquiry regarding payment of the $5,000.00, which may have been 
sometime in March, 1982, Colman told him that he did not believe 
he had to pay the $5,000.00. When Colman contacted Allen, Allen 
reaffirmed for him that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be 
paid and advised Colman against paying it, inasmuch as the 
consideration supporting the total deal was comprised of those 
considerations set forth hereinabove at Finding 22. Allen 
consistently advised Colman, Archer, Wolfe and Plaintiff that th< 
parties to the Option never intended for Colman to pay the 
$5,000.00. Colman never conceded that he owed the $5,000.00. 
26. The Defendants1 later assertions that Colman!s 
non-payment of the $5,000.00 rendered the Option invalid and 
unenforceable lacks credibility , This Court finds that 
Defendants argument is^mortely a •eonv^ R-ireQt-^ fter—fehetigfat which 
th^ y-tj-fretH-in, an fl£teinpt.£^^nv^^^ . It was never 
agreed or intended that Colman was to pay $5,000.00 to the 
Defendants. The number recited was fictitious, which is why the 
Defendants signed the Option acknowledging their receipt of that 
sum, as well as their receipt of the "other good and valuable 
consideration", which phrase circumscribed the true consideration 
for the Option. The Defendants1 testimony as to their purported 
negotiations, renegotiations and the calculations which they 
allege resulted in the $5,000.00 consideration for the Option is 
contradicted not only by Alien's testimony and Colman's Affidavit 
but by Defendant's own pleadings (viz., paragraph 4 of their 
Third-Party Complaint) . 
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27o The Defendants represented to Colman and his attorney 
that Colman would have a right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch. 
Defendants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on 
those representations and upon the sufficiency of the Opt ion, as 
executed. Colman and his attorney did rely on those 
representations and on the Option as executed. In light of 
Defendants1 subsequent repudiation of the Option, that reliance 
was to Colman!s detriment. 
28. Archer and Wolfe never visited the Anderson Ranch or tht 
Carson Sink salt project until the Spring of 1982. They never 
checked the title to the Carson Sink properties, nor did they evei 
verify the water rights appurtenant to the Anderson Ranch, until 
the Spring of 1982. The Defendants never secured title insurance 
on the Anderson Ranch. 
29. The overriding royalty rights m the Carson Sink which 
the Limited Partnership Agreement states will be assigned to 
Archer and Wolfe had not been assigned to them or recorded by then 
at the time of trial, four (4) years after the Limited Partnershif 
Agreement was executed. No profits have ever been paid out by 
Solar Chemical to Archer or Wolfe. 
30. The price purportedly paid for the Anderson Rancn by 
Defendants to Royalty ($250,000.00), and the price which Colman 
was to pay Defendants to reacquire the Anderson Ranch under the 
Option only eighteen (18) months later ($650,000.00), cannot, as a 
matter of reason, stand alone. The property was professionally 
appraised (See Exhibit 59) for $427,240.00 ten (10) years prior to 
the sale by Colman to the Defendants. Moreover, even if the 
Anderson Ranch was worth only $250,000.00 on January 4, 1982, the 
Court cannot believe that Colman had a reasonable expectation that 
the market value of the Anderson Ranch would be 260% of its prior 
sales value only 1-1/2 years later (or at any time in between). 
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price he could for the ranch at the time, it was admitted that 
Colman, who had known for several years that MilLer was interest 
in acquiring the Anderson Ranch or an interest therein, never 
contacted Miller to see if he would be interested in bidding mot 
than $250,000.00 for it. These prices make sense only when viefo 
in the context of the layer, unified transaction., 
3L. Although it is not strictLy necessary to its decision, 
the Court finds that the $650,000.00 purchase price for Colman1s 
exercise of the Option more truly corresponds to a twenty percen 
(20%) return on a composite $500,000o00 secured investment by 
Defendants in Colman1s salt project for one and one-half (1-1/2) 
years. The total transaction was the functional equivalent of a 
secured loan ($500,000.00 loaned by Defendants to Colman for 1-1 
years at 207o interest, secured by the Anderson Ranch in case he 
failed to repay them), dressed up so as to give Archer and Wolfe 
certain additional incentives and to secure the Defendants vario 
tax advantages (e.g., the tax write-off for their investment in 
Solar Chemical was worth a minimum to Archer and Wolfe of 
$60,000.00 -- See Exhibit 11). 
32. The Court finds much credibility m the testimony of 
Allen. His recollections under oath are entitled to great weigh 
He was the only witness to the original negotiations ana the 
preparation and execution of the central documents who was not a 
party to the same. He has no interest in the Anderson Rancn or 
the outcome of this litigation. Judging by his own testimony, ai 
that of the Plaintiff, John Clay and John Miller, and Allen's owi 
April 29, 1983 Affidavit (Exhibit 27), his statements have been 
consistent from the beginning with respect to the true nature of 
the parties1 integrated transaction and the Option, in particulai 
If Allen's testimony were to be biased, one would reasonably 
expect that bias to favor his client- but instead, Allen 
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33o By contrast, the testimony of Bill Colman at trial, whei 
measured against his admissions on cross-examination. and the 
contradictions contained in his prior deposition, his Affidavit o 
May 2, 1983 (Exhibit 28), and his handwritten notes (Exhibits 54, 
55 and 56), convince the Court that his testimony at trial is 
entitled to very little weight or credibility. Although Colman's 
Affidavit and handwritten notes are not strictly necessary to the 
Court's decision herein, they represent a more reliable index of 
the true history and intention of the parties than his trial 
testimony several years later and also serve to seriously impeach 
his trial testimony. His affidavit was signed under oath at a 
time when the relevant facts were much fresher in his memory than 
at trial, when his recollection of several matters was 
insufficient or non-existent. When Plaintiff's counsel presented 
him with Exhibits 54, 55 and 56, Colman expressed considerable 
surprise, alarm and anger, but admitted subsequently that they 
were copies of his own handwritten notes which he then read for 
the Court. Although trie notes are not totally legible, are 
partially cut off by the copier (particularly Exhibit 54) , and 
were stapled together by Plaintiff's attorneys, they are for the 
most part dated, reference Defendants Archer and Wolfe and nave a 
certain narrative flow and consistency that gives them substantial 
credibility. Any undue surprise to Defendants was overcome by the 
several days interval they had to inspect the Exhibits after their 
introduction and before Colmanfs testimony on the same. The 
demeanor of all the witnesses was significant to the Court during 
this trial. 
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34. In the late Spring or early Summer of 1982, Miller 
learned from Archer and Wolfe that they had obtained an interest 
in the Anderson Ranch. Subsequently, either in August or 
September of 1982. Miller discussed the status of the Anderson 
Ranch with Colman, who represented to Miller that Archer and 
Wolfe*s interest in the Anderson Ranch was in the nature of a 
security interest. At the same time, Colman indicated a desire 
sell his rights in the Anderson Ranch to Miller. 
35. Plaintiff's attorney, William L. Fillmore, of Logan, 
Utah, (hereinafter "Fillmore"), thereafter communicated with bot 
Colman and Allen and received from them copies of the documents 
covering the prior integrated transaction between Colman and the 
Defendants, including receipt from Colman of the Option with 
original signatures of John Archer, Elizabeth Archer and Elliott 
Wolfe, and an original notarization by Carole Lake. The 
correspondence between Fillmore, Allen and Colman (Exhibits 68, 
69, 70 and 71) and testimony at trial indicate the preparation o. 
a draft Real Estate Contract by Fillmore, Allen and Colman1s 
review of the same, negotiations (including one meeting at the • 
Salt Lake Airport between Colman, Miller, Fillmore and John 
Miller, the Plaintiff's nephew), and the modification of the 
original draft, 
36. On November 2, 1982, Colman and Allen met Plaintiff,. 
Fillmore and John Miller at the Salt Lake Airport to review and 
execute the revised Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9, hereinafter 
the "Real Estate Contract") between Colman and Miller. After 
Colman and Allen reviewed the same, Colman and Miller then 
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executed the Real Estate Contract, dating the same November 2, 
1982. Pursuant to the contractual obligation contained therein. 
Miller paid the $1,000.00 consideration to Colman in December, 
1982. 
37. The Real Estate Contract assigned all of Colman's rights 
under the Option to Miller, granting Miller an independent right 
to exercise the Option and acquire 1007o of the Anderson Ranch on 
or before June 18, 1982. 
38• Colman knowingly, voluntarily and with advice of counsel 
warranted in the Real Estate Contract to Miller that f,the Option 
is valid and enforcable and, further, that it is freely assignable 
in its entirety without the consent or approval of any third 
party." 
39. As part of the Real Estate Contract, Miller gave Colman 
a new and independent option to reacquire from Miller (if Miller 
exercised the Option), on or before July 2, 1983, all of the 
Anderson Ranch by paying Plaintiff $650,000.00 on or before that 
date (See Exhibit 9, para. 4.a.), and a second option to 
reacquire, after July 2, 1983 and on or before July 2, 1984, up to 
a 507o interest in the Anderson Ranch by paying his prorated share 
of the purchase price, plus interest, taxes and improvements (See 
para. 4.b.). Plaintiff and Colman agreed that the Real Estate 
Contract was not assignable by either party without the other 
party's prior written consent (See paras. 4.e. and f.). 
40. Also as part of the Real Estate Contract, the parties 
granted each other a mutual and reciprocal right of first refusal 
with respect to either party's subsequent proposed sale of any of 
their rights or interests in the Anderson Ranch, and specified a 
thirty (30) day period in which to exercise the same after receipt 
of written notice from the selling party, accompanied by a copy of 
the duly executed contract of sale (See para. 5). 
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41. At the November 2, 1982 meeting in SaLt Lake City, Ut<; 
whereat the Real Estate Contract was executed, it was observed 
that Carole Lake, who had notarized the Option, had failed to fj 
in the blank ("March _, L982") in the notary's paragraph of tlr 
original Option., Colman volunteered to have her correct this an 
referred to the omission as a simple oversight. Subsequently, tf 
Latce did fill in the blank with the number ML" and the Option wa 
returned to FilLmore by Colman for recording with the Real Estat 
Contract, which recordings were effected in Cache County on 
December 20, L982. 
42. After Archer and Wolfe received written notice from 
Miller's attorney, Fillmore, of Colman's assignment of his Optio 
rights to Plaintiff, Archer calLed Fillmore on or about January 
1983 and told FiLlmore, among other things, that the $5,000.00 f 
the Option had never been paid by Colman. Nonetheless, Archer 
indicated that Defendants were still willing to sell the Anderso 
Ranch to Plaintiff if he would pay $655,000.00. 
43. During January and February of 1983, Archer, Wolfe and 
Fillmore engaged in negotiations for Miller's purchase of the 
Anderson Ranch' but the sale was never consummated because the 
parties could not agree upon terms, and because Miller was seekit 
a guaranty from Colman that he would not exercise nis rights 
under paragraph 4.a. in order to ensure that rtiiLer would not 
incur substantial financing costs in vain. 
44. On April 8, 1983, the Defendants attempted to revoke tt 
Option by a letter to Colman from the Defendants' prior attorney, 
Gregory P. Williams (Exhibit 15), wnerein said attorney advised, 
based upon his clients' position that "no consideration was giver 
for the Option", that "the offer has been withdrawn". 
45. On April 15, 1983, Colman, Allen, Plaintiff, Fillmore, 
John Miller and John Clay (an employee and financial adviser of 
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had represented previously as to the history and intent behind th 
Option given Colman by the Defendants, in light of Archer and 
Wolfe's position on the $5,000.00 and what appeared to be a 
probability of litigation over the same. Colman and Allen 
reaffirmed at that meeting to Plaintiff and his attorney and 
employees that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be paid, but 
was a number pulled out of the air by Allen as he prepared the 
documents; that Wolfe represented that he had full authority to 
sign the Option for his trust• and that the series of documented 
transactions (the Limited Partnership, the Contract, the Special 
Warranty Deed(s) and the Option), were all part of one, unified, 
integrated scheme which was basically intended to get $500,000o00 
to Colman for his salt project, secure the repayment of the same 
with the Anderson Ranch and guaranty Colman the right to reacquire 
the ranch upon his payback of the $500,000.00 plus a $150,000.00 
premium on the same, structured in a way to give Defendants 
additional incentives and secure certain tax benefits important tc 
them -- all of which comprised the true consideration for the 
deal. Allen and Colman agreed to give Plaintiff their Affidavits 
to this effect. 
46. At the April 15, 1983 meeting in Salt Lake City, Colman 
also indicated his willingness, after consulting further with 
Allen, to sign a Waiver and Release similar to the one previously 
requested by Plaintiff in February, 1983 (See Exhibit 34), because 
Colman was m no position to purchase the Anderson Ranch before 
July 2, 1983 and wanted Miller to buy it so that he (Colman) could 
at least have a shot at acquiring a partial interest on or before 
July 2, 1984. 
47. On April 19, 1983, Colman signed a Waiver and Release 
for Miller's benefit, which Waiver and Release was subsequently 
recorded in Cache County on April 20, 1983 (Exhibit 10, 
hereinafter the ,!Waiver and Release11) . The intent of Colman and 
Miller with the Waiver and Release was to give Miller the 
unqualified right, without any fear that Colman would attempt to 
bo -••XTJ 
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reacquire 100% of the Ranch, to exercise the Option and 
acquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983, thereby (a 
guarantying Plaintiff, by Coimanfs waiver of his paragraph 4.a. 
option rights, that Plaintiff, at the very least, would be the 
owner of 50% of the Anderson Ranch (even if Colman were to 
exercise his option under paragraph 4.b. subsequently), (b) 
eliminating the June 18, 1983 deadline for Millerfs exercise of 
the Option, because Colman was not in a position to exercise his 
rights under the Option or the Real Estate Contract by July 2, 
1983, and he wanted Miller to do so, and (c) assuring Colman tha 
he wouLd later be able to exercise his 50% option reserved under 
paragraph 4.b. if he could come up with the money on or before 
July 2, 1984, because Miller's ownership of the ranch would then 
make the paragraph 4.b. option possible. This mutual intent is 
clearly refLected by the language contained in the Waiver and 
Release: (viz., "...which Waiver and Release is executed by the 
undersigned in order to induce said Ernest Junior Miller to 
exercise his rights under the aforesaid Real Estate Contract and 
purchase the subject property on or before July 2, 1983, without 
fear of any claim of right by William J. Colman to repurchase the: 
same from Ernest J. Miller, except as to William J. Colman1s 
reserved right to purchase up to a 50% interest in the subject 
property after July 2, 1983 and before July 2, 1984."). (Emphasi 
added.) 
48. Colman induced Miller to exercise the Option, making it 
clear that he had until July 2, 1983 to do so, for Colmanfs 
benefit as well as Miller's. Because Colman, at that point, had 
to rely on Miller's ability to purchase the ranch, he extended 
Miller's time to exercise the Option until July 2, 1983, and 
reserved only his right to reacquire up to 50% the next year. It 
would have been irrational, given his financial circumstances and 
his dependence on Miller's exercise, for Colman to arbitrarily 
(and against his own best interests) limit the time for Miller to 
exercise the Option. The purpose of the Waiver and Release was 
further corroborated by Colman's subsequent conduct after its 
63 -U021J 
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execution (i.e.. no objection) and by Miller's conduct in 
reliance thereon (i.e., its execution on July 1), The Court also 
notes that the Defendants were not parties to the Waiver and 
Release, nor were they privy to Coiman and Miller's intent 
regarding the same. 
49. No consideration is stated on the face of the Waiver anc 
Release, but the Court finds from the testimony at trial that it 
was given by Coiman in exchange for MilLerfs assurance that he 
would exercise the Option, guarantying Coiman another year to 
acquire a partial interest in the ranch, and as additional 
consideration, for Miller's promise to Coiman that he would not 
have to pay interest on any exercise of his paragraph 4.b. option 
and that, in any event, Coiman would be entitled to use the 
property for recreational purposes for the rest of his life. 
50. Following a review of two draft affidavits prepared by 
Fillmore, Allen prepared his own Affidavit (Exhibit 27), signed 
and had it notarized on April 29, 1983. Allen spent the better 
part of the morning on May 2, 1983 with Coiman, preparing and 
modifying his draft of Colman's Affidavit (Exhibit 28), which was 
reviewed and discussed by them paragraph-by-paragraph, amended by 
them, and then executed by Coiman and notarized by Allen's 
secretary, all on the same day. 
51. On April 18, 1983, Plaintiff called Archer and offered 
to pay $650,000.00 to the Defendants for the Anderson Ranch under 
the Option. Archer indicated that he would have to visit with 
Wolfe before responding. On April 20, 1983, Archer called Miller 
back and informed him of the Defendants' rejection of Miller's 
offer of $650,000.00 for the Anderson Ranch, indicating that 
Defendants did not want to sell the property. 
52. In April of 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to persuade 
Coiman to exercise his option rights under paragraph 4.a. of the 
Real Estate Contract, so that Archer, Wolfe and Coiman could sell 
the property to a third party, and cut Plaintiff out (See Exhibits 
2, 56 and 74). They were subsequently advised by Allen, 
63 -SJ021 
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however that the Waiver and Release which Colman had signed 
for Miller's benefit made such an attempt to prevent Miller fro 
acquiring the ranch ilLegal. 
53. On May 16, L983. Plaintiff filed this action against t 
Defendants and a Lis Pendens against the Anderson Ranch, On Jun 
240 1983, the Defendants filed their Answer. Defendants filed 
their Third-Party Complaint against Colman on June 30. 1983o and 
then filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim against Plainti 
on July 1. 1983. 
54. On or about June 27 or 28, 1983, Fillmore called E. 
Craig Smay, of Salt Lake City, Utah, the Defendants1 attorney 
(hereinafter MSmaylf) , to determine the Dest way to make the form* 
tender of the $650,000.00 to the Defendants under the Option in 
the context of this pending litigation concerning the same 
property, the Option and the same parties. Inasmuch as Archer ai 
Wolfe had rejected Miller's prior offer, and had expressly 
repudiated the Option in their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, 
all parties and their attorneys understood that Miller's tender c 
a cashier's check would not be accepted by the Defendants. 
Moreover, neither Archer nor Wolfe were in the State at the time. 
Archer admitted on the stand that he would not have accepted 
Plaintiff's tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983 in any event. 
Fillmore and Smay determined that the best way to handle the 
matter would be to tender the $650,000.00 to the Defendants via 
the Court and then deposit the same upon endorsement in a 
Court-supervised, interest-bearing account. 
55. On July I. 1983, Fillmore met with Smay at the latterfs 
office in Salt Lake City and tendered to Smay, as Defendants' 
attorney. Plaintiff's cashier's check to the Defendants for 
$650,000.00 (Exhibit 13), which money had been borrowed by 
Plaintiff, subject to interest charges. At said meeting the 
attorneys modified and signed a Delivery of Check and Motion and 
stipulated Order (Exhibit 14), with the express understanding tha 
the check would be deposited in a Court-supervised, interest-
bearing account and that "entitlement to accrued interest shall b 
determined by the Court". Pursuant thereto, tillmore later 
fcl'b? &3 ",v9 
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that same day filed said Delivery of Check and Motion and the 
Order with this Court and deposited the check with the Clerk of 
the Court. 
56. The language contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, and in 
the Delivery of Check and Motion and the stipulated Order, and the 
verbal expressions of Fillmore to Smay on July 1, 1983, substan-
tially conformed with the tender language requirements of 
paragraph 3 of the Option. 
57. The Option was exercised on July 1? 1983 by Plaintiff, 
without any objection or protest being made by Colman to Piaintif1 
either before or since. 
58. The Option was exercised by Plaintiff according to its 
terms - i.e., the Option called for a tender of $650,000.00 on or 
before July 2, 1983, which requirements Plaintiff met precisely* 
The Defendants were in no way prejudiced by the date of 
Plaintiff's execise of the Option, inasmuch as they had already 
granted that much time to the original optionee- Moreover, the 
Defendants had already made it abundantly clear to Plaintiff, by 
virtue of their prior rejections, that they did not intend to 
accept any tender by Plaintiff regardless of when it might be 
made. 
59. Shortly thereafter, at Smay's suggestion, the parties 
through their attorneys entered into a Stipulation to replace the 
original check (Exhibit 13) with a new check (Exhibit 16), so as 
to permit the deposit of the tendered funds, in the absence of the 
Defendants from the State, into an interest-bearing account. 
Pursuant to that Stipulation, $650,000.00 was subsequently 
deposited at First Interstate Bank, Logan Branch. In the Fall of 
1983, the deposited funds were invested in revolving monthly 
Certificates of Deposit at said, bank, which arrangement continued 
until the time of trial. 
60. On July 2, 1984 Colman, Archer and Wolfe enterea into a 
certain Agreement (Exhibit 33). whereby Colman, for $5,000.00. nas 
further consideration for this agreement," agreed to convey to 
Archer and Wolfe a fifty percent (507o) interest in the Anderson 
b3 -Jjiio 
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Ranch which he hoped to procure through an attempted exercise 
of his paragraph 4.b. option under the Real Estate Contract* anc 
whereby Archer and Wolfe agreed to permit Plaintiff to withdraw 
$364,000.00 from the Court-supervised savings account, as and fc 
Colman's tender of that sum, to make possible Colman's exercise 
the 4.b. option, with the express understanding that Colman woul 
deed said interest over to Archer and Wolfe upon his receipt of 
deed from Miller. The Defendants and their attorney had 
previously received copies of the Real Estate Contract by way of 
Plaintiff's prior pleadings and the discovery herein. 
61. On July 2, 1984, a Notice from CoLman (Exhibit 31) and 
Stipulation from the Defendants (Exhibit 32) was ser,ved on John 
Clay, an officer of E. A. Miller & Sons Packing Co., & compan/ — 
effectively controlled by Plaintiff, advising Plaintiff that 
Defendants were willing to allow him to withdraw $364,000.00 fro 
the Court-supervised account for purposes of Colman's exercise o 
the 4.b. option, which attempted exercise of the 4.b. option by 
Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) was never accepted by Miller. 
62. Nonetheless, the funds in the Court-supervised account 
were not Colman1s funds, nor were they the Defendants' funds ab-
sent their delivery of a deed to Plaintiff (See the terms of Exh 
bit 14, paragraph 4), which they had not done. Moreover, if Mil 
ler had accepted such a tender on July 2, and withdrawn the fundi 
the withdrawal would have been subject to an early withdrawal 
penalty under the certificate of deposit (See Exhibit 60). 
63. Prior to Colman's (and the Defendants') attempted exer-
cise of the 4.b. option, neither Colman nor Defendants had secure 
Plaintiff's prior written approval of any assignment of Colman1s 
rights, as required by paragraph 4.f. of the Real Estate Contract 
nor was there any prior verbal notice to or approval by Plaintiff 
In fact, it appears that Defendants structured their deal in a 
deliberate manner to avoid the non-assignability clause. 
64. In connection with Colman's (and the Defendants') 
attempted exercise of the 4.b. option, no recognition was ever 
given to Miller's first right of refusal. The Plaintiff was neve 
lM>.f 63 •>&24 
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given written (or verbal) notice of the Agreement between 
Defendants and Colman, nor the sale terns thereof which he would 
have to meet, nor was he ever allowed to exercise his first right 
of refusal within thirty (30) days after receiving a copy of what 
should have been a conditional agreement between Colman and the 
Defendants, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract. 
Plaintiff did not learn of, or receive a copy of, the Agreement 
between the Defendants and Colman until the discovery of the same 
was compelled at Defendants' second depositions on September 27, 
1984. The Agreement between Colman and the Defendants 
unconditionally required Colman to convey to Defendants all his 
rights in the Anderson Ranch which he was to acquire pursuant to 
paragraph 4.b. of the Real Estate Contract. 
65. The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any kind 
suggesting collusion or conspiracy between Colman and Plaintiff to 
defraud Defendants of their interests in the Anderson Ranch or 
regarding any damages suffered by Defendants related thereto, as 
alleged in their Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Indeed, 
Defendants introduced little, if any, evidence concerning these 
allegations. Tf"Th P r~F~~wn?r -?m-y^  coll H-^ H -^TT^3*^***^^^ this— 
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66. The legal description of the Anderson Ranch contained in 
the Contract, the Option, the Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and 
Release and Plaintiff's Complaint all contain an obvious 
scrivenor's error, referencing "Township 10 South11, instead of the 
correct description, "Township 10 North", under Parcel 3. None of 
the parties herein are under any misconception as to which 
property was intended to be sold, assigned or otherwise referred 
to in these documents and pleadings, nor have Defendants seriously 
claimed any prejudice if the Court reforms the same. 
bfi/ 
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67. The Defendants have enioyed possession and all rights 
ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Plaintiff1s July 1, 1983 
tender of the $650,000.00. The Defendants have executed leases 
with third parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch, most recen 
ly with Boyd Munns, to run cattle on the ranch property. All 
rents paid under such leases have been received by the Defendant 
68. In contrast to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has 
received no rents or income, nor has he had any other commercial 
benefit, from the Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00 
on July 1, 1983; nor has he had the use of his money since then. 
What limited and sporadic recreational use Plaintiff has had of 
the ranch has been without objection by the owners and similar t 
that enjoyed historically by many others in the area. 
69. The Defendants could have received the $650,000.00 
lodged in the Court-supervised savings account at any time after 
July 1, 1983 if they would have provided Plaintiff with a proper 
deed, but they have never delivered a deed to Plaintiff entitling 
them to said tender money. 
70. The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any collusioi 
or conspiracy between Colman and Miller to defraud the Defendant 
out of their interests in the Anderson .Ranch, as alleged by 
Defendants1 in their Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. 
71. Exhibits 54,55 and 56 are notes made by Colman at or 
about the time of various conversations between Colman, Archer ai 
Wolfe and should be admitted as evidence. Exhibit 28 is Colman? 
Affidavit made prior to this litigation and is corroborative of 
the Court's findings on various issues and should be admitted in 
evidence for all purposes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has in rem iurisdiction over the Anderson 
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Defendants and the Third-Party Defendant; and subject matter 
jurisdiction over those matters which have been brought before the 
Court by way of the parties' pleadings, including without 
limitation all matters affecting title to the Anderson Ranch as 
between the parties named herein, 
2. That the Real Estate Contract is valid and enforceable in 
all respects and that the Option granted by Archer and Wolfe to 
Colman is irrevocable, valid in all respects and is supported by a 
sufficient consideration. 
3. That the Option was fully assignable by Colman, was 
assigned to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is the owner and holder of 
the Option. The Waiver and Release is a valid and enforceable 
agreement in all respects and extended to July 2, 1983 the time 
within which Miller should exercise the Option. 
4. That Plaintiff made a valid exercise of the Option under 
the circumstances and is entitled to a decree specifically 
enforcing the Option. 
5. Given the uniqueness of the Anderson Ranch property, 
money damages would be inadequate compensation to the Plaintiff 
for Defendants1 repudiation of the Option. 
6. That Plaintiff has paid the purchase price provided in 
the Option by depositing the same with the Clerk of the Court and 
a decree should enter awarding the $650,000.00 so paid by 
Plaintiff to Defendants. 
7. That interest accrued on the $650,000.00 purchase price 
deposited with the Court is the property of Plaintiff and a decree 
should enter awarding Plaintiff all interest accrued on said 
$650,000.00 while in the custody of the Clerk of the Court. 
8. That a decree should enter correcting the scrivenors 
error describing Parcel 3 of the legal description in the Option, 
Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and Release, and Plaintiff's 
N & HOGGAN * 9 
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Verified Complaint, to Township 10 North rather than Township 
10 South. 
9. Neither the ReaL Estate Contract or the rights and 
entitlements of Colman thereunder were assignable by Colman to a 
third party without Plaintiff's prior written consent, which 
consent was never sought nor given by Plaintiff . 
lb* The first right of refusal granted to Miller by Colman 
under paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract was a valid, legal 
right vested in Miller and enforceable by him against Colman and 
any third party. 
11. The Waiver and Release was a valid and enforceable 
agreement between Colman and Plaintiff, was supported by adequat 
consideration and was intended to and did enable Plaintiff to 
lawfully exercise the Option to purchase the Anderson Ranch on o 
before July 2, 1983. 
12. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option 
under the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Defendants) on Jul 
2, 1984 was an invalid exercise of that option right and is, 
therefore, void and of no effect. 
13. The said Warranty Deeds from Royalty Investment 
Corporation to Defendants on the Anderson Ranch effected a valid 
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Royalty Investment Corporati 
to Defendants. 
14. An order should enter admitting Exhibits- 28, 54, 55 an 
56 in evidence.-/^ <_. "fv
 v- fj <._*i//i/ A/ ) /;'/-,:,'< .:-- ,\«L ~7, • /.<. 7^ 
15. Possession of trie Anderson Ranch should b£^delivered t 
Plaintiff. 
16. Though the Court finds that the applicable burden of 
proof upon Plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence, the Cou 
concludes that Plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving his 
claims against Defendants and Third-Party Defendants in this cas 
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17. Plaintiff's pleadings should be amended to conform in 
all respects to Plaintiff's theories, arguments and evidence 
presented at trial. 
LET JUDGMENT EJ^ TER ACCORDINGLY: 
DATED this "/' day of- Ju^, ~1986. 
,'
m 
Omer J. Call 
District Judtge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Defendants1 Attorney, 
E. Craig Smay, at 208 Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; and to Third-Party Defendant, William J. Colman, 
at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage 
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this <£^ £ day of July, 1986. 
A^S$k*c f%Lf** 
L^  Brent Hogg an ,/ / 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
-4 & HOGGAN 
fNEYS AT LAW 
EST CENTER 
) BOX 5 2 5 
I UTAH 8 4 3 2 1 
) 7 5 2 1551 
ERNEST J. MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH 
B. ARCHER, both individually and 
as Trustees for the Elizabeth 
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT 
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, 
Defendants. 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH 
B. ARCHER, both individually and 
as Trustees for the Elizabeth 
Dalv Archer Trust, and HUBERT 
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. COLMAN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Civil No. 21692 
( > UJ • 'JjUU 
A'ju: " ' - ' ^ 
&£TH 3. ALIBI, Clerk 
**v s i — Deputy 
-2-
THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the 
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Omer Je Call, District Judge 
presiding and sitting without a iury, on September 18, 19, 20, 2" 
October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985; and Plaintiff 
having been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggai 
of Olson & Hoggan, the Defendants having been represented by the" 
counsel of record, E. Craig Smay, and the Third-Party Defendant 
having been represented by himself; and the Court having heard 
testimony from witnesses for all the parties hereto during the 
trial hereof and having received certain exhibits offered by the 
parties as evidence in the matter; and the Court having received 
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants c 
the primary issues before the Court, and having reviewed the 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment prepared by Plaintiff and the 
Defendants1 Objections thereto, and the Court: having heretofore 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure No. 15, and on 
Plaintiff's motion at trial, the Plaintiff's Complaint is deemed 
amended to conform to the evidence and Plaintiff's arguments at 
trial, specifically including but not limited to quieting title 1 
the Anderson Ranch with regard to Colman's (and Archer and 
Wolfe's) attempted exercise of the 4.b. option one (1)-year aftei 
this litigation commenced, Plaintiff's claim to the accruing 
interest on the tender money, and Plaintiff's request that the 
Option, Real Estate Contract, Waiver and Release and the Complait 
herein be reformed to reflect the correct legal description of t\ 
Anderson Ranch. 
2. The Court declares that the recorded Option, Real Estate 
Contract and Waiver and Release are valid agreements, binding on 
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proper assignee of Colmanfs Option on the Anderson Ranch and 
all appurtenant water rights. 
3. Plaintiff is the owner and holder of the Option, the 
Option is declared irrevocable, and by virtue of Plaintiff's 
proper exercise of the Option and Plaintiff's tender on July 1, 
1983 of the purchase price provided in the Option, the Option is 
specifically enforced and title to the Anderson Ranch situated in 
Cache County, Utah and described as follows: 
Parcel 1: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter; 
the South half of the Northeast quarter; the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter; the East half of the 
Southeast quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southwest 
quarter of Section 26; the North half of the Northwest 
quarter; the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 25; the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter; 
the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter; the Southwest 
quarter of the Southeast quarter; the South half of the 
Southwest quarter of Section 24; the Southeast quarter of the 
Southeast quarter of Section 23; in Township 10 North, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; the 
Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter; the Southwest 
quarter of the Southeast quarter; and the Northeast quarter 
of the Southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 10 North, 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the 
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 10 
North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 3: The Northeast quarter; the Southeast quarter of 
the Northwest quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 19, the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the 
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in 
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the 
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26, 
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the 
•N&HOGGAN Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the Southeast 
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quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 1 
North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Containing 1840,14 acres, more or less, subject to existing 
rights of way. 
Together with »all water rights appurtenant to the above-
described property. 
is hereby vested and quieted in Plaintiff free and clear of 
all right and claim by Defendants, Royalty Investment Corporatic 
or Colman and any claiming by, under or through Defendants, 
Royalty Investment Corporation or Colman. 
4. The $650,000.00 deposited by Plaintiff with the Clerk c 
the Court is declared to be payment in full by Plaintiff to 
Defendants for the Anderson Ranch. The Clerk of the Court is 
authorized and directed to deliver to Defendants on their reques 
the $650,000.00 principal. 
5. All interest accrued on the $650,000.00 deposited by 
Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court is declared to be the 
property of Plaintiff and the Clerk of the Court is authorized a 
directed to deliver all such accrued interest to Plaintiff on hi 
request. 
6. The legal description in the Option (recorded in Book 3 
at Page 144 of the records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) i 
the Real Estate Contract (recorded in Book 310 at: Page 147 of th 
records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in the Waiver and 
Release (recorded in Book 315 and Page 658 of the records of the 
Cache County, Utah Recorder), as well as in the Verified Complai 
filed by the Plaintiff herein, are each and all reformed to show 
Parcel 3 situated in Township 10 North, rather than Township 10 
South. 
7. That possession of the Anderson Ranch, described above, 
is hereby delivered to PLaintiff free and clear of any claim, 
SON & HOGGAN 
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possessory or otherwise, of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants 
and Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or 
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty 
Investment Corporation. 
8. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option under 
the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) on July 
2, 1984 is declared by the Court to be an invalid exercise of that 
option right. The agreement and any assignments or conveyances of 
whatsoever nature between Colman and the Defendants related 
thereto are hereby declared void and of no effect as to the 
parties herein; and full, undivided title in fee simple to the 
Anderson Ranch is hereby quieted in Plaintiff as against any and 
all claims or rights of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants and 
Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or 
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty 
Investment Corporation. 
9. The Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion To Strike are rendered moot by this Judgment and Decree, 
which effectively grants the partial relief sought by those 
motions but which is based on the entire trial record. 
10. The Defendants1 Cross-Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment is denied. Defendants1 Counterclaim against the 
Plaintiff and Defendants1 Third-Party Complaint against Colman are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
11. That Exhibits 28, 54, 55 and 56 ar$ admitted in , / 
evidence^^w \ ^ ,/ - '•; ;/'' *"* * -->-<• * - • • -•< v/*> - -- •' 
12.' The parties shall bear their own respective attorney's 
fees, but Plaintiff is awarded his court costs incurred herein*. 
DATED t h i s ^day o f i ^ f c ^ , 1986. 
N & HOGGAN 
3NEYS AT LAW 
IEST CENTER 
> BOX 525 
*. UTAH 84321 
1)752-1551 
/ V / 
Oraer J . Cal l 






I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoii 
Judgment and Decree to Defendants1 Attorney, E. Craig Smay, at 2< 
Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and 
to Third-Party Defendant, William Jo Colman, at 1935 South Main, 
Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage prepaid in Logan, 
Utah, this tf^ day of July, 1986. 
/^A%c*f~* 
L. Brent Hoggan 
WLF/28 
ON ft HOGGAN 
'ORNEYS AT LAW 
5 WEST CENTER 
PO BOX 525 





I hereby certify that I mailed a certified copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Judgment and Decree to 
L. Brent Hoggan, Olson & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plaintiff, 56 West Center, 
P. 0. Box 525, Logan, Utah 84321; E. Craig Smay at 208 Kearns Building, 
136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and to Third-Party Defendant, 
William J. Colman, at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84105, postage prepaid in Brigham City, Utah, this 7th day of August, 
1986. 
>^/^UyL. <^ > /"frW,,c^ 
Mary C. Holmgren-Deputy 
63 -di;3fi 
